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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do licensed adoption agencies have standing to obtain a judicial 
determination of the applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 
(the "ICPC") to situations where the agencies bring expectant mothers to Utah prior to 
delivery and placement of their children for adoption, if the agencies were ordered by the 
state defendants to comply with the ICPC in such situations, failure to comply with the 
ICPC can result in licensing violations up to and including revocation of their license, 
and compliance with the state's interpretation could negatively affect their business? 
This issue was raised by way of the state defendants' motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing. R. 23-56. 
This question turns primarily on whether appellants presented a justiciable 
controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 and 
78-33-2. Whether appellants stated a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Salt Lake County 
Comm yn v. Short, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899. Plaintiffs note that the district court 
dismissed their complaint based on an entirely different issue concerning standing that is 
not applicable to their request for a judicial construction of the ICPC. 
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2. Does the ICPC apply to the movement of an unborn child across 
state lines where the ICPC expressly applies to the "placement" of a "child," and the term 
"child" is defined as "a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, 
guardianship, or similar control"? 
This question was raised in the district court in plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment. R. 178-232. 
Interpretation of statutory language is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, f 5, 31 P.3d 637, 538. 
While the district court did not interpret the statute because it dismissed the 
complaint for lack of standing, this Court "may pass upon and determine all questions of 
law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final 
determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 30(a). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be 
presented on remand should be addressed by this court."). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, Jurisdiction of district courts — Form -- Effect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions 
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. 
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. 
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form 
and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or 
statutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or 
franchise, may have determined any question of construction 
or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status 
or other legal relations thereunder. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701. Interstate Compact on Placement of Children — 
Text. 
ARTICLE II Definitions 
As used in this compact: 
(1) "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is 
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control. 
(2) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer, or 
employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or 
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, 
association, Indian tribe, charitable agency, or other entity which 
sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another 
party state. 
(3) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is 
sent, brought or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public 
authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for 
placement with state or local public authorities or for placement 
with private agencies or persons. 
(4) "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a 
child in a family free, adoptive, or boarding home, or in a child-
caring agency or institution but does not include any institution 
caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic or any 
institution, primarily educational in character, and any hospital or 
other medical facility. 
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ARTICLE III Conditions for Placement 
(1) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent 
or brought into any other party state any child for placement in 
foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the 
sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set 
forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving 
state governing the placement of children therein. 
(2) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be 
sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or 
as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall 
furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state 
written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in 
the receiving state. The notice shall contain: 
(a) The name, date, and place of birth of the child. 
(b) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal 
guardian. 
(c) The name and address of the person, agency, or institution to or 
with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the 
child. 
(d) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and 
evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is 
proposed to be made. 
(e) Any public officer or agency in a receiving agency state which 
is in receipt of a notice pursuant to Paragraph (2) of this article may 
request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or 
agency of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entitled to 
receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it 
may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the 
purpose and policy of this compact. 
(f) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or 
brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public 
authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in 
writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear 
to be contrary to the interests of the child. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
District Court. 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed June 10, 2002, by three adoption 
agencies after they were told by the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of 
Human Services to comply with the ICPC before bringing expectant birth mothers to 
Utah to deliver their children and possibly place them for adoption.1 R. 1-12. The 
agencies sought a declaration that, among other things, the ICPC does not apply to the 
movement of unborn children across state lines, so compliance is not required for a non-
resident expectant birth mother who plans to deliver her child in Utah and place it for 
adoption. R. 6-7. The agencies also asserted the constitutional rights of expectant birth 
mothers to travel to Utah to deliver their children, and sought a declaration that the 
Office of Licensing's interpretation of the ICPC violated this right.2 R. 7-8. 
Later, on September 3, 2002, the agencies added certain defendants 
connected with the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children (the "AAICPC"). R. 147-61. The state defendants based their 
interpretation of the ICPC on a 1986 opinion by the Secretariat of the AAICPC. 
1
 Plaintiffs originally filed their case in federal court alleging the 
constitutional right to travel belonging to birth mothers as the basis for federal 
jurisdiction. The federal court, however, dismissed that action for lack of standing and 
plaintiffs refiled in state court. 
2
 The Agencies do not raise this issue of the right to travel on appeal. 
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Defendant Michael Chapman sought advice and guidance from the AAICPC on issues 
raised by this lawsuit, and on or about July 9, 2002, the AAICPC issued a seven-page 
letter to Mr. Chapman reaffirming the 1986 opinion and providing guidance concerning 
issues raised by plaintiffs. R. 124-34. 
On July 1, 2002, the state defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
the agencies did not present a justiciable controversy and that the agencies did not have 
standing to raise the constitutional rights of the expectant birth mothers. R. 23-56. On 
October 16, 2002, the adoption agencies filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
arguing that the plain language of the ICPC did not apply to an unborn child that is 
transported across state lines. R. 178-232. On October 17, 2002, the AAICPC 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss joining in the state defendants' motion and also 
arguing that because their Secretariat's opinions are not binding, the Agencies failed to 
state a claim for relief against them. R. 238-52. 
Following oral argument, on January 28, 2003, the district court issued a 
minute entry granting the state defendants' motion to dismiss solely on the basis that 
plaintiff agencies did not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of expectant 
birth mothers. R. 359-62. The district court did not address whether the agencies had 
standing on their own to obtain an interpretation of the ICPC. The district court signed a 
final order on February 25, 2003, R. 363-69, and two of the plaintiff agencies filed a 
notice of appeal on February 28, 2003. R. 370-72. 
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IL Statement of Facts. 
The ICPC is a uniform law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. R. 182.3 The ICPC establishes 
procedures for the interstate placement of children and fixes responsibility for those 
involved in placing the child. R. 182. 
Each state appoints a Compact Administrator and one or more Deputy 
Administrators who oversee or perform the day-to-day tasks associated with the 
administration of the ICPC. R. 182. In Utah, the Compact Administrator's office is 
located within the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), which is a division 
of defendant Department of Human Services (the "Department"). The Department, 
through the DCFS, is responsible for accepting and reviewing information submitted in 
connection with placement of children across state lines pursuant to the ICPC. Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-703. R. 182. 
Plaintiffs are three adoption agencies licensed by the state of Utah; 
Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love ("Act of Love"), 
Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), and A TLC Adoption, Inc. Only 
3
 Many of the facts recited are as stated in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. These facts were not disputed by defendants and, therefore, 
are deemed admitted. R. 254, 297. 
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Act of Love and Adoption Center have taken this appeal.4 They will be referred to 
collectively as the "Agencies." 
Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") has been appointed as the 
Deputy Compact Administrator for the State of Utah, and until recently he was also 
president of the AAICPC. R. 182. Mr. Chapman has a bachelor's degree in social 
science, but he does not have a Utah social work license. R. 322. Defendant Robin 
Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is the Executive Director of the Department. 
R. 183. Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is a Licensing Specialist in the Office 
of Licensing of the Department with responsibilities for adoption agencies. R. 183. 
Defendant Dennis Eshman is the Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the 
AAICPC. R. 183. Defendant AAICPC is a national organization, the members of which 
are the Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators of the various 
states. R. 183. Defendant American Public Human Services Association ("APHSA") is 
Secretariat of the AAICPC. R. 183. 
As licensed child-placing agencies, the Agencies are charged by the State 
of Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are 
relinquished to them for adoption. R. 183. The Agencies are required to follow certain 
4
 That A TLC Adoption has chosen not to participate in the appeal should 
not be taken as a sign that it does not believe in the merits of its arguments presented in 
the district court. It has reasons, wholly separate from the merits of the case, for not 
participating in this appeal. 
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regulations designed to protect children, birth parents, and adoptive parents in the 
adoption process. See, e.g., Utah Admin. Code §§ R501-7-5.F; R501-7-8.B.3; 
R501-7-5.A. R. 183. 
A significant portion of the Agencies' business includes birth mothers who 
choose, for personal and varied reasons, to come to Utah to deliver their children and 
place them for adoption. R. 151. Prior to November 19, 2001, the state of Utah had not 
required that the Agencies comply with the ICPC when bringing an expectant birth 
mother to Utah from another state, although defendant Chapman had expressed the 
opinion that it did apply. R. 152, 184. 
The state defendants took the position commencing November 19, 2001, 
that the ICPC must be complied with before an expectant mother travels to Utah to 
deliver her child in Utah. R. 184. They base their interpretation in part on a 
June 30, 1986 opinion issued by the Secretariat of the AAICPC, Secretariat Opinion #49 
("Opinion #49"). R. 184. 
Opinion #49 addresses the question of whether "a birth mother who comes 
to State A from another state in order to give birth and then places her child with a State 
A couple [can] thereby avoid application of [the] Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children." R. 184,208-10. The opinion states: 
Where the expectant mother crosses a state line 
as part of the placement plan and arrangement, 
the transaction should be viewed as an interstate 
placement. In enacting the Compact the intent 
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of the state legislatures was not to make the 
protections of placements depend on 
mechanical manipulation of the delivery point. 
Such logistic calculations are nothing more than 
subterfuges and studied efforts to avoid the 
inte[n]ded and normal consequences of the law. 
R. 209. 
On December 3, 2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each of the Agencies 
informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the 
Department "have been directed... to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and 
licensing actions concerning child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in 
another state travel to Utah to give birth and place their child for adoption." R. 184, 
211-13. 
This interpretation is problematic because the plain language of the ICPC 
requires approval from the "receiving state" prior to a child entering that state. Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article 111(2). To obtain such approval, notice must be given 
to the receiving state containing information including the "name, date, and place of birth 
of the child." Id., Article III(2)(a). Of course, if the child is not yet born, this 
information cannot be supplied. 
Yet, pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the 
suspension or revocation of the Agencies' licenses as child-placing agencies. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article IV. R. 184-85. Thus, the Agencies face not only 
practical problems relating to how the ICPC is to be complied with where a child has not 
10 
yet been born, but also a very real threat of administrative action if they do not comply. 
Indeed, on March 1, 2002, defendant Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing, sent 
Adoption Center a "Corrective Action Plan for Non Compliance with Rules" because she 
alleged Adoption Center violated the December 3, 2001 letter.5 R. 52-53. 
On June 10, 2002, the Agencies brought a complaint in Third Judicial 
District Court against the state defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
R. 1-12. The Agencies asked in their complaint that the district court declare that the 
ICPC did not apply to unborn children and that requiring ICPC compliance for an 
expectant birth mother violated the birth mother's constitutional right to travel. R. 6-8. 
After this litigation was commenced, defendant Chapman sought guidance 
from the AAICPC concerning the application of the ICPC to expectant birth mothers 
who travel interstate. The AAICPC responded with a seven-page letter detailing its 
continued adherence to Opinion #49, opining about this specific lawsuit, and offering 
support, assistance, and guidance. R. 124-34. 
Because of this involvement by the AAICPC, the Agencies filed a second 
amended complaint on September 3, 2002, naming the AAICPC, its president at the time 
(who was defendant Chapman), its staff manager Dennis Eshman, and the entity 
5
 The state later withdrew this Corrective Action Plan pending the outcome 
of this litigation. 
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identified as its Secretariat, the APHSA. R. 147-61. Collectively, these defendants were 
known in the district court as the Association defendants. 
On July 1, 2002, the state defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
the Agencies had not stated a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
and that they lacked standing to raise the constitutional rights of the birth mothers. 
R. 23-56. On October 17, 2002, the Association defendants filed a motion to dismiss of 
their own and joined in the state's motion. The Association defendants argued that the 
Agencies did not state a claim for relief against them because Opinion #49 is not binding 
on the state. R. 238-52. 
On October 16, 2002, the Agencies filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment asking the district court to declare that the ICPC could not be interpreted to 
apply to unborn children brought into Utah by their expectant mothers. R. 178-232. The 
Agencies did not raise the issue of the birth mother's right to travel in their motion. 
Following oral argument, on February 25, 2003, the district court granted 
the state defendants' motion to dismiss solely on the basis that the Agencies purportedly 
do not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of birth mothers. R. 363-69. The 
district court concluded as follows: 
3. In this case, plaintiffs lack standing because they 
fail to request relief for an alleged violation of their own 
constitutional rights. Instead, plaintiffs predicate their entire 
allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of non-party 
expectant mothers. 
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4. Plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, have 
standing to assert the rights of a third party. In order to do so, 
plaintiffs must show: "first, the presence of some substantial 
relationship between the claimant and the third parties; 
second the impossibility of the right holders asserting their 
own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a 
dilution of third parties' constitutional rights." Shelledv, 836 
P.2dat789. 
5. Plaintiffs lack the ability to assert third party rights 
of expectant mothers because plaintiffs'relationship with 
third party expectant mothers is not "substantial," the third 
party mothers are capable of asserting their own 
constitutional rights, and there is nothing to indicate that 
failure to permit third party standing will somehow dilute the 
expectant mothers' constitutional rights. This conclusion is 
inextricably linked with defendants' arguments on 
declaratory judgment. 
R.367. 
The district court did not consider whether the Agencies had standing on 
their own to challenge the state's or the AAICPC's interpretation of the ICPC, which is a 
request for declaratory judgment the Agencies made separate from the issue of the impact 
on a birth mother's right to travel. R. 367. 
The district court also denied the Agencies' motion for partial summary 
judgment, and it dismissed the Agencies' complaint without prejudice. R. 368. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Agencies have standing on their own, without looking to the rights of 
expectant birth mothers, to obtain a judicial declaration of the application of the ICPC to 
unborn children. The district court apparently did not see that this is a wholly separate 
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issue that did not depend upon the rights of the birth mothers and did not require 
third-party standing. The Agencies have also stated a justiciable controversy sufficient to 
allow for a judicial determination of the issue. They have been told to comply with the 
ICPC when bringing expectant birth mothers to Utah, and they run the risk of licensing 
violations if they do not. Yet, compliance with the ICPC in such circumstances could 
also harm their business. 
The plain language of the ICPC only applies to children already born, and 
not to unborn children carried by expectant mothers. This Court and others have held 
that the ordinary meaning of the word "child" means a child that has been born. Thus, 
the ICPC is unambiguous and only applies to the "placement" of a "child" who is bom, 
and it does not apply to an unborn child. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGENCIES HAVE STANDING ON THEIR OWN TO OBTAIN 
A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 
ICPC. 
The district court dismissed the Agencies' complaint because it apparently 
understood they were asserting only the rights of third-party expectant birth mothers. 
That is not correct. The Agencies have standing on their own to obtain a judicial 
declaration of the applicability of the ICPC because they were ordered by the state 
defendants to comply when they bring an expectant birth mother to Utah, and they run 
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the risk of licensing violations if they do not comply. This interpretation of the ICPC 
also harms the Agencies' business. 
For someone to have standing, the person must have a direct and personal 
stake in the outcome of the litigation. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 
1983). To have a direct, personal stake in the outcome means that there is a causal 
relationship between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental actions, and the relief 
requested. Id. If a plaintiff is injured by government action, that person automatically 
has a direct and personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Id. 
A substantial part of the Agencies' business involves bringing expectant 
mothers to Utah, if the mothers so choose, to deliver their children and possibly place 
them for adoption. Prior to November 19, 2001, the Agencies were not required to 
comply with the ICPC when they brought expectant mothers to Utah. However, on 
December 3, 2001, the Office of Licensing ordered all adoption agencies to comply with 
the ICPC when bringing an expectant mother to Utah for delivery and possible placement 
of the child for adoption. R. 211-13. Adoption agencies are required to comply with the 
ICPC. Utah Admin. Code § R501-7-11 .A. Violation of the ICPC can result in the 
suspension or revocation of an agency license. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article 
IV. Indeed, the Office of Licensing showed by its March 1, 2002 letter to the Adoption 
Center that it was serious about enforcing the ICPC pursuant to the terms of the 
December 3, 2001 letters. R. 52-53. 
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Thus, the Agencies have a direct, personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation. The state defendants have improperly told them to comply with the ICPC in 
circumstances where compliance is not required. If the Agencies are correct that the 
ICPC does not apply in these circumstances, they will be freed from the ever-present 
threat of licensing violations if they do not comply and they will be able to conduct their 
business as they have in the past. Thus, the Agencies have standing on their own to 
obtain a judicial declaration of the applicability of the ICPC. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. 
While the district court did not rule on this issue, defendants argued in the 
district court that plaintiffs had not stated a justiciable controversy. This is wrong. This 
Court has stated the purpose of the declaratory judgment procedure as follows: 
The purpose of the creation of the declaratory 
judgment procedure was to avoid the difficulties of the 
common-law rule that rights would not be adjudicated by a 
court unless there had been a violation for which relief could 
be granted; and to provide a means for resolving 
uncertainties and controversies before trouble has 
developed or harm has occurred, and in order to avoid 
future litigation. 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120-21 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). 
Thus, to state a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
there must be a genuine justiciable controversy in that (1) the 
interests of the parties involved are adverse, (2) the party 
seeking relief must have, or assert a bona fide claim, of a 
legally protectable interest therein, and (3) the issues must be 
ripe for judicial determination. That is, it must appear either 
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that there is an actual controversy, or that there is a 
substantial likelihood that one will develop so that the 
adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or 
avoiding controversy or possible litigation. 
Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
The Declaratory Judgment Act itself states that it "is to be liberally 
construed and administered" "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity 
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. In 
view of this command, this Court has written that "the court will be indulgent in 
entertaining actions brought to achieve that objective; and more particularly so, where 
there is a substantial public interest to be served by the settlement of such an issue." 
Salt Lake County, 570 P.2d at 121 (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 78-33-12 "allow[s] 
for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a 'justiciable controversy.'" Salt Lake 
County Comm 'n v. Short, 1999 UT 73,t12, 985 P.2d 899, 903 (emphasis added). 
With these principles in mind, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows an 
action by "[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a 
statute,.. . contract or franchise, [to] have determined any question of construction or 
validity arising under the . . . statute . . . contract or franchise and [to] obtain a declaration 
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. "A 
contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-3. Furthermore, "[w]hen declaratory relief is sought all persons shall 
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be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11. 
Plaintiffs have stated a justiciable controversy that can be resolved by the 
Court through the declaratory judgment process. They seek a declaration of their rights, 
status or other legal relations under a statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. They also 
present an actual controversy, or the substantial likelihood that one will develop. Other 
cases this Court has decided show clearly that a proper declaratory judgment claim exists 
in this case. 
In Salt Lake County, the county sought a declaratory judgment as to, 
among other things, issues surrounding the city's right to unilaterally terminate the 
county's water supply, which it purchased from the city, without notice or hearing. The 
county claimed the city had threatened to unilaterally terminate service to the county 
without notice or hearing. The city argued that because there had been no actual 
termination or even decrease in water supplies, the county had suffered no damage or 
disadvantage and, therefore, there was no controversy on which to base a declaratory 
judgment action. 570 P.2d at 120. 
This Court concluded that because of the county's dependency on city 
water, and the great difficulty the county could face if its supplies were cut off, the 
dispute was a proper subject of a declaratory judgment proceeding "to relieve uncertainty 
and insecurity and to avoid possible controversy and harm" so that "those depending on 
18 
such services, should have an authoritative adjudication as to what their rights are; and 
equally important, what their rights are not." Id. at 121. 
In Short, at issue was the parties' disagreement over the nature of the 
attorney-client relationship between the county commission and county attorney, whether 
the county commission could hire independent counsel, and whether the county could 
make charitable contributions. The parties simply disagreed on the legal issues involved, 
but there were no actual "live" circumstances where their differing opinions were to be 
applied by the court. This Court, however, concluded that the controversy over the 
powers of each office was sufficient to create a justiciable controversy. It wrote: 
The record convincingly evidences the fact that these two 
parties have continually contested the power each entity has 
over the other and the nature of their legal relationship. The 
dispute will continue to affect the public interest, and under 
the Act it is proper to resolve these issues, so that both parties 
can devote their full energies to the performance of their 
respective duties. 
1999 UT 73, f 13, 985 P.2d at 903. 
In Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972), the plaintiffs 
each desired to be sterilized. They sought a declaration that a certain statute, which 
prohibited sterilization of a certain class of people, did not apply to them. None of them 
had been sterilized, and none of them had been charged with violating the statute. Each 
had been told by a lawyer that he or she may be guilty of violating the statute if they did 
submit to voluntary sterilization, and each of their doctors refused to perform the 
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procedure. 28 Utah 2d at 37,40,497 P.2d at 849, 851. In ruling that a justiciable 
controversy had been pleaded, this Court wrote that "[a]s to declaratory judgment, the 
very purpose of that statute was to provide a means for securing an adjudication without 
the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into serious difficulty before 
he could seek to have his rights determined in court." Id. at 41, 497 P.2d at 851-52 
(emphasis added). 
An actual controversy also exists in this case. Steps have been taken by the 
state defendants to require the Agencies to comply with Opinion #49, yet the Agencies 
were not required to comply with Opinion #49 before, and they dispute that Opinion #49 
correctly states the law. On December 3, 2001, each plaintiff was told by letter that the 
Office of Licensing and the Department "have been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on 
all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child placing agencies where expectant 
mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth and place their child for 
adoption." R. 211-13. The Agencies do not want to comply with Opinion #49 because 
they believe it incorrectly states the law, but pursuant to Article IV of the ICPC, plaintiffs 
could have their licenses suspended or revoked for failure to follow the ICPC. Thus, a 
real controversy exists over the applicability of the ICPC when a birth mother travels to 
Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption, and a real threat exists that failure to 
follow Opinion #49 could result in a loss of the Agencies' licenses. 
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The courts do not need to sit idly by and wait for one of the Agencies to 
lose its license before a judicial declaration of the applicability of the ICPC can be made. 
As this Court said in Parker, "the very purpose of that statute was to provide a means for 
securing an adjudication without the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or 
get into serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights determined in court." 
28 Utah 2d at 41, 497 P.2d at 851-52 (emphasis added). Clearly, a justiciable 
controversy exists in this case. 
III. THE ICPC DOES NOT APPLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF 
UNBORN CHILDREN. 
"When interpreting statutes, [the courts] determine the statute's meaning by 
first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless 
the language is ambiguous." Blackner v. State DepL ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, \ 12, 48 
P.3d 949. "When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). 
When determining whether an ambiguity exists, moreover, the Court is to 
look at the "ordinary meaning of the terms," and if the ordinary meaning "results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction 
to the express purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of [the] Court to assess the wisdom 
of the statutory scheme." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982) 
(emphasis added). Only if there is an ambiguity in a statute should the Court "look 
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beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos v. 
Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, f 13, 993 P.2d 207. 
Under the plain language of the ICPC, no placement comes within its reach 
unless it includes the "placement" of a "child" across state lines. The ICPC only 
regulates a placement when a "sending agency" "send[s], bring[s], or cause[s] to be sent 
or brought into any other party state any child for placement...." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 62A-4a-701, Article 111(1). The ICPC defines what must happen before such a 
placement across state lines can occur, including the sending of a notice containing the 
name, date, and place of birth of the child, and provides that "[t]he child shall not be 
sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate 
public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the 
effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the 
child." Id., Article III(2)(a) and (f) (emphasis added). Thus, while the ICPC regulates 
"placements" across state lines, it only regulates placements involving a "child" who 
crosses state lines. As such, the definition of "child" is key. 
The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is 
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." Id., Article 11(1). This 
definition does not explicitly include an unborn child, so the issue is whether it should be 
interpreted to include an unborn child. It should not. 
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This Court in Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach , 714 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 
1986), wrote that the "ordinary and usual" meaning of the word "child" is "a child which 
has been born." The United States Supreme Court, in Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 
579, 580-81, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1183, 1184-85, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975), also wrote that the 
"ordinary meaning" of the "word 'child' [] refer[s] to an individual already born, with an 
existence separate from its mother." While these cases were not decided under the ICPC, 
they were statutory construction cases where the courts had to look to the "ordinary 
meaning" of the word "child" to ascertain the meanings of the statutes they were 
construing, just as this Court must do. 
Because the ordinary meaning of the word "child" in Utah and elsewhere is 
"a child which has been born," Roach, 714 P.2d at 1148, the term "child" in the ICPC is 
unambiguous. It only applies to a child who has been born, and even the ICPC does not 
define it differently. This Court should so rule. 
The only state appellate court to consider whether the ICPC applies when 
an expectant mother crosses state lines to deliver her baby and place the child for 
adoption was the Nebraska Supreme Court in Yopp v. Blatt, 467 N.W.2d 868 (Neb. 
1991). In Yopp, the birth mother was from Iowa, and she went to Nebraska to deliver her 
child and place it for adoption. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the ICPC 
did not apply because the child was born in Nebraska, not Iowa, and was placed for 
adoption in Nebraska. 
23 
[The] child was bom in Omaha, Nebraska.. . . The child 
was never taken from [Nebraska] to . . . Iowa, the residence 
of [the birth mother]. The fact that [the birth mother] is a 
resident of Iowa is not determinative in this case. The 
[ICPC] does not mandate that the residence of the mother 
is considered the residence of the child. The child was 
never a resident of Iowa and was not placed across state lines. 
[The ICPC] is not applicable. 
Yopp, 467 N.W.2d at 878 (emphasis added). 
The Kansas Supreme Court construed the term "child" in its adoption 
statute in In re Adoption of Vincent, 202 Kan. 663, 451 P.2d 173 (1969), and said it 
carried the "plain, ordinary meaning—a living child who could be the subject of 
measurable paternal attention." 202 Kan. at 666, 451 P.2d at 176. That court also wrote 
that the term "child" is "customarily used to refer to an individual in being as 
distinguished from one not yet bom, as a fetus which has no existence of its own apart 
from its mother . . . . " Id. Based on this decision, the Kansas Attorney General issued an 
opinion in 1988 concluding that the ICPC did not apply to an expectant mother who 
traveled to Kansas to deliver her child and place for adoption. Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. 
No. 88-174 (December 28, 1988). R. 229-32. 
Similarly, in State of Florida, Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
Services v. Friends of Children, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Fla. 1986), a Florida 
statute prohibited a birth mother from taking or sending her "child" out of state for 
purposes of adoption. The statute defined "child" as "a son or daughter, whether by birth 
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or adoption." 653 F. Supp. at 1226. The court interpreted this language as not applying 
to a fetus since it did not expressly include a fetus. Id. 
Policy considerations also support the Agencies' position. When a birth 
mother travels to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption, the best interests of 
the child are protected whether she places the child with an adoptive family in Utah or an 
adoptive family residing elsewhere. If she places through one of the Agencies, the best 
interests of the child will be protected because the Agencies are child-placing agencies 
licensed by the state of Utah. As licensed child-placing agencies, they are required to 
protect those interests. Utah Admin. Code § R501-7-1 O.C.I ("Adoption agency mission 
statements, policies, and procedures shall assure that the . . . best interests of the child are 
paramount." ). If they have failed in that responsibility, they would not continue to hold 
their licenses. The Agencies must have certified or licensed clinical social workers on 
staff to make placement decisions, unlike Mr. Chapman—the Utah ICPC decisionmaker, 
who holds no Utah social work licenses. See Utah Admin. Code §§ R501-7-4.A.7.b, 
R501-7-8.D, and R. 322. The interests of the child are protected to the same extent the 
interests of a child born to a Utah birth mother would be protected by the Agencies, and 
Mr. Chapman does not sign off on those adoptions. 
If a birth mother comes to Utah to deliver and she places through one of the 
Agencies with an out-of-state family for adoption, the Agencies would be required to 
obtain ICPC approval for the placement from Utah to the other state, thereby again 
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insuring the interests of the child are protected and that the receiving state has had a hand 
in the placement. Either way, the laws of the state where the child will ultimately live, 
and not where the birth mother comes from, will determine the appropriate level of 
protection for the child. This is entirely consistent with the ICPC, which only requires 
approval of the "receiving state." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article III(2)(f). In 
each case, the best interests of the child are protected. 
In sum, the term "child" in the ICPC should not be interpreted to include an 
unborn child. Because it does not include an unborn child, compliance with the ICPC is 
not required when an expectant mother travels to Utah to deliver her child and place it 
for adoption. 
IV. THIS COURT CAN ADDRESS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
ICPC PRIOR TO REMAND. 
While the district court did not address the construction of the ICPC 
because it dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, this Court can address the merits 
of the Agencies' argument. This Court "may pass upon and determine all questions of 
law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final 
determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 30(a). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be 
presented on remand should be addressed by this court."). If the Court finds that the 
Agencies have standing to challenge the State's and the AAICPC's construction of the 
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ICPC, the Court should also rule on the legal question of the applicability of the ICPC to 
the movement of an unborn child. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the decision of the district court and find that the 
Agencies have standing to obtain a judicial declaration concerning the applicability of 
the ICPC when an expectant birth mother travels to Utah to deliver her baby. The Court 
should also hold that the ICPC does not apply in such cases. The case should then be 
remanded to the district court for further proceeding consistent with the requested 
rulings. 
DATED this 15th day of May, 2003 
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Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, dba Act of Love, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., and A TLC Adoption, Inc. bring 
this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Michael Chapman, in his 
official capacity as Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate Compact on Placement of 
Children, Robin ArnoId-Williams, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Human Services, Janice P. Knaphus, in her official capacity as a Licensing 
Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of Human Services, and the Utah 
Department of Human Services, a governmental department of the State of Utah, and complain 
and allege as follows: 
PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love 
("Act of Love") is a Utah non-profit corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the 
state of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), is a Utah 
corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the state of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff A TLC Adoption, Inc. ("TLC") is a Utah corporation and is a 
licensed child-placing in the state of Utah. 
4. Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") is an individual residing in the 
state of Utah and, upon information and belief, has been appointed as the Deputy Compact 
Administrator responsible for coordination of all activities under the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children (Utah Code § 62A-4a-701, hereinafter "ICPC") for the state of Utah. 
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5. Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is an individual 
residing in the state of Utah and is the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human 
Services, the department of Utah government responsible for activities under the ICPC. 
6. Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is an individual residing in the 
state of Utah and is a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of 
Human Services with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies. 
7. Defendant Utah Department of Human Services (the "Department"), is the 
department, through its Division of Child and Family Services, responsible for accepting and 
reviewing information submitted in connection with placement of children across state lines 
pursuant to the ICPC, and is also responsible, through its Office of Licensing, for licensing 
adoption agencies. 
8. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4(1). 
9. Utah's Declaratory Judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-33-1, also grants this Court the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." 
Moreover, "[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a 
statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . 
statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-2. 




11. The ICPC is uniform legislation in force in all 50 states. It requires 
agencies, entities, and persons seeking to place children across state lines to obtain prior approval 
for placements. The approval process requires the party placing the child to give notice of the 
placement to the ICPC administrator and other appropriate public authorities. An evaluation of 
the suitability of the placement is performed to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to 
approve the placement. 
12. As licensed child-placing agencies, plaintiffs are charged by the state of 
Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are relinquished to 
them for adoption. Plaintiffs are required to follow certain regulations designed to protect the 
children, the birth parents, and adoptive parents in the adoption process. Thus, plaintiffs are 
charged with protecting the same interests the ICPC seeks to protect. 
13. Plaintiffs are often contacted by expectant mothers outside of the state 
who are contemplating placing their expected children for adoption. 
14. Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant 
mothers travel to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely. 
15. The children are then delivered in Utah facilities and may be placed for 
adoption through plaintiffs' agencies, although each birth mother retains the right to keep her 
baby until she actually signs a relinquishment or consent to adoption, which cannot occur until at 
least 24 hours after 1he baby is born. 
16. A substantial part of plaintiffs' businesses involve expectant birth mothers 
who travel to Utah to deliver their babies and to place them for adoption. 
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17. Defendants have taken the position that the ICPC must be complied with 
for an expectant mother to travel to Utah to deliver her child in Utah. 
18. Defendants takes their interpretation from a June 30, 1986 opinion issued 
by the Secretariat of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children, Secretariat Opinion #49 ("Opinion #49"). 
19. Opinion #49 does not have the force of law and has not been adopted as 
the law in Utah. 
20- In 2000, Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing and at Chapman's 
instruction, cited Act of Love for a licensing violation for failing to obtain prior approval before 
an expectant mother was brought into the state of Utah to deliver her child. The Office of 
Licensing withdrew the violation after Act of Love questioned the application of the ICPC to the 
situation. 
21. On November 21, 2001, an attorney for the Department of Human 
Services wrote to an attorney for Act of Love that "the Office of Licensing has been instructed, 
as of November 19, 2001, to enforce those [ICPC] requirements with regard to all licensed child 
placing agencies." This language referred to requiring agencies to obtain ICPC approval when 
helping an expectant birth mother travel to Utah. 
22. This letter resulted from guidance received by Arnold-Williams from an 
assistant Utah Attorney General recommending that the Department use Opinion #49 "as 
guidance for the department's regulatory actions, specifically for the Office of Licensing and the 
Division of Child and Family Services." 
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23. Similarly, on December 3,2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each plaintiff 
informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the Department "have 
been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child 
placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth 
and place their child for adoption." 
24. Pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the 
suspension or revocation of plaintiffs' licenses as child-placing agencies. 
25. Shortly after receiving the December 3, 2001 letter, plaintiffs filed suit in 
federal court challenging the interpretation of the ICPC found in Opinion #49. That action was 
dismissed without prejudice by the federal court on jurisdictional grounds. 
26. On March 1, 2002, during the pendency of the federal action, Knaphus 
sent a corrective action plan and a finding of a licensing violation to Adoption Center of Choice 
for violating the December 3, 2001 letter, even though defendants had stipulated to an injunction 
against enforcement while the case was pending. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
27. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the 
same here by this reference. 
28. The ICPC applies only when a "child" from another state is brought or 
sent to any other state for placement in foster care or preliminarily for a possible adoption. 
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29. The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is 
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." ICPC, Article 11(1). The definition 
of "child" in the ICPC does not include a fetus or an unborn child. 
30. The ICPC further requires the party placing a child across state lines to 
give notice, containing, among other things, the name, date, and place of birth of the child, and 
the identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian. ICPC, Article 111(2). 
31. When an expectant mother travels to Utah, the "child" to be placed for 
adoption is not "brought" or "sent" under the ICPC, and the child never becomes a resident of 
another state. Rather, the child is born in and is a resident of Utah. The child is, therefore, not 
brought to Utah across state lines and the ICPC does not apply. 
32. Indeed, until the child is relinquished to one of plaintiffs' agencies, the 
child is not subject to placement and remains in the legal custody and control of the birth mother. 
33. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15.1 provides that the ICPC only 
must be complied with in an adoption proceeding when the child is born out of state. 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration from this Court finding that the 
ICPC does not apply to situations where an expectant mother travels to Utah and delivers a child 
here. 
35. The interpretation of the ICPC made by Opinion #49 and adopted by 
defendants also infringes on the right of an expectant mother contemplating adoption to travel 
interstate. The interpretation imposes a penalty on expectant mothers traveling state to state by 
requiring compliance with the ICPC when the expectant mother desires to travel to another state 
to deliver her child and to place it for adoption. 
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36. Expectant mothers from Utah do not have to go through these same ICPC 
approval procedures to place their children with plaintiffs's agencies. 
37. Because Opinion #49fs interpretation of the ICPC and the consequent 
requirements defendants have imposed upon plaintiffs impair expectant mothers' constitutional 
rights to travel, the interpretation should be declared unconstitutional, and defendants, and those 
acting in concert with them, should be enjoined from enforcing the interpretation. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunctive Relief) 
38. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the 
same here by this reference. 
39. Opinion #49's interpretation of the ICPC is contrary to the language of the 
ICPC and Utah law. 
40. This interpretation is being enforced by defendants through requirements 
placed upon licensed child-placing agencies such as plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have been told they 
must comply with the interpretation effective November 19, 2001. 
41. A significant part of plaintiffs' businesses involve non-resident, expectant 
birth mothers who deliver their babies in Utah for adoption. 
42. Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if Opinion #49 is enforced against 
them. 
43. Plaintiffs have no adequate legal remedy and must resort to the equitable 
remedy of injunctive relief. 
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44. Defendants, and all those acting in concert with defendants, should be 
enjoined, preliminarily and permanently, from enforcing Opinion #49 and their unconstitutional 
and invalid interpretation of the ICPC. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays for the following relief: 
a. For a declaration that the ICPC does not apply when an expectant mother 
travels to Utah to give birth in Utah and/or for a declaration that defendants' interpretation 
violates an expectant birth mother's right to travel. 
b. For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against defendants, and all 
those acting in concert with them, from enforcing Opinion #49. 
c. For attorney fees and costs of this action as may be allowed by law. 
d. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this (0 day of June, 2002 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 




Act of Love 
9561 South 700 East, Suite 101 
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Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
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Layton, Utah 84041 
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State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
120 Noah 200 West. Suilo 303 
P.O Box 45500 
Salt take City, Utah 84145-0500 
(801)S3S-4242 
an equal opportunity employer March 1,2002 
James C. Webb, Executive Director and 
Karyn Takke, Director of Social Work 
The Adoption Center of Choice 
241 West 520 North 
Orem,UT 84057 
RE: Corrective Action Plan for Non Compliance with Rules 
Child Placing Adoption Agency License # 5889 
Complaint #0123.02 
Dear Mr. Webb and Ms. Takke: 
Based upon the results of a complaint investigation, the following Corrective Action Plan has 
been prepared. This is done in accordance with Rule 501-1-5 Corrective Action Plan for Non 
Compliance with Rides. These requirements are based upon the following Rule that was the 
subject of the complaint: 
R501-7-11.A. For interstate placements, adoption agencies shall comply with 
requirements of the Interstate Compact for Placement of Children. The agency's attorney 
advised the agency that since the child was bom in Utah, ICPC would not apply, per UCA §78-
30-15-1 Compliance with the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children- In any adoption 
proceeding the petition for adoption shall state whether the child was born in another state and, 
if so, both the petition and the court's final decree of adoption shall state that the requirements 
of Title 62A. Chapter 4a, Part 7, Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, have been 
complied with. On December 3,2001, the Office of Licensing notified all licensed child placing 
adoption agencies regarding the applicability of the ICPC to child placing agencies when 
expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their children for adoption. The birth 
mother in question is clearly not a resident of Utah She came to Utah, gave birth to the child on 
August 6,2001, then returned to North Carolina with the child. She later decided to proceed 
with her adoption plan and the agency brought her to Utah to relinquish custody. It appears that 
the birth mother was transported to Utah in order to bypass ICPC procedures. Substantiated 
violation of Rule. 
Agency Action Required 
By March 8, 2002, the agency will complete and submit through the appropriate channels 
ICPC Form 100 A for approval of the placement of Kenneth Skylar Baker, AKA Franklin 
Edward Osborne HI, dob 8/6/01, with a courtesy copy to the Office of Licensing. Furtliermore, 
in all cases in which the agency transports birth parents lo Utah from another state the agency 
will conform to ICPC procedures. 
Measurement of Success ~ Summary of Consequences 
If the agency refuses to conform to ICPC procedures the agency license will be placed on 
Conditional status. 
Please sign this plan on the lines provided and return it to this office within five working 
days. A second copy of the plan is enclosed for your records. If you have any questions, please 
do not hesitate to call me at (801) 538-8222. 
Sincerely, 
fil^Afif^ 
Janice P> Knaphus 
Licensing Specialist 
James C. Webb, Executive Director Date 
Karyn Takkc, Director of Social Work Date 
Enclosure 
cc: Complainant 
Reta Oram, Director 
Office of Licensing 
Alan Hayward, Supervisor 
Office of Licensing 
Carol Verdom, Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney General's Office 
Mike Chapman, ICPC 
JPK/add 
CRAIG L. BARLOW (#0213) 
JOELA.FERRE(#7517) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
dba ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC 
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity 
as Deputy Compact Administrator of the 
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children; 
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, in her official 
capacity as Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Human Services; JANICE P. 
KNAPHUS, in her official capacity as Licensing 
Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah 
Department of Human Services; and the UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a 
governmental department of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 020905025 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED 
••- DISTRICT COMRT 
02 JUL - ] PH 3:23 
-.;.}• uAKEOEPARTMcHf 
ncpTJTY CLERK 
Defendants, by and through their attorneys Craig L. Barlow and Joel A. Ferre, Assistant 
Attorneys General, move the Court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) & (6). Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment on an interpretation of the Interstate Compact 
on the Placement of Children (the "ICPC"), Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (2002). The Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the Complaint, however, because plaintiffs cannot maintain standing. Specifically, 
plaintiffs improperly attempt to assert the rights of non-party expectant mothers and plaintiffs 
themselves have not suffered any injury-in-fact because of defendants' conduct. This motion is further 
supported by a Memorandum. 
DATED this f^_ day of July, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
IG L. BARLOW 
A. FERRE 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this day of July, 2002, to: 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins 
G. Troy Parkinson 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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American Public Human Services Association 
Association of Administrators of tha Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 
July 9,2002 
Mike Chapman 
Deputy Compact Administrator, ICPC 
Division of Children, Youth, and Families 
120 North 200 West, Suite 225 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84103 
Dear Mike: 
You have requested an analysis of a case involving a Utah child p'acing agency, a 
Pennsylvania binhmother, and an effort to place the chili from Uiah (o Colorado. This 
letter contains such an analysis and (he views of the Secretariat to tfie Asawciarion of 
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chjldrun. 
FACTS, A Pennsylvania binhmother relinquished her child to a Utah child-placing 
agency (hereafter referred to as "Agency"). She did so while she was in Utah, This was 
done without using the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children OCCPC). The 
Agency then submitted a Form 100A (Request for Placement) pi rsuant tn ICPC 
requesting placement of the cbild with Colorado prospective adoptive parents. The Form 
100A was submitted through the Utah Compact Administrator b it sent by Colorado to 
Pennsylvania in the belief that Pennsylvania is the appropriate o ipnatixig state for mis 
placement transaerion. Eennsylvania requires that, one o( its. fonns providing information 
&^brnpleted bytt\e birthxaother, but she refases to do so. / UU£L( u c r ^ 
Earlier, the Agency commenced suit in a federal coun against the Utah Oepury Compact 
Administrator, the head of (he Utah Human Services Departme'it and an official of the 
Utah licensing unit. The suit asked a declaratory judgment thai ICPC does not apply to 
cases in which a binhmother comes to Utah from another jurisdiction to surrender her 
child for adoption, gives birth h Utah and then places her chiH w,th a Utah Agency. 
Secretariat Opinion #49 of the Association of Administrators rf die Interstate Compact 
on the Placement of Children takes die position that ICPC does apply 10 such cases, and 
the Utah Department notified that Agency that it would enforce the position taken in 
Secretariat Opinion #49. 
The Federal Court wsued a temporary injunction requiring the Utah Compact 
Administrator not to enforce ICPC i& such cases against me /tgency. The injunction was 
"'•*un SMHVM Ajaooaiidft. r«p(cvpiing fi Mr. hum* I JUfwecS since 1930 
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to remain in effect during the pendency of the suit. Approximately three months 
thereafter, the Federal Court dismissed the suit- The relinquishment by the Pennsylvania 
birthmother took place during the period when the temporary injunction was in effect. It 
is expected that the JJtah Agency will take theposttibn thai it is not r^uired ro follow 
ICPC in this case because the birthmother came to Utah and surrendvTOcl her vhild while 
the injunction was in effect Further, the Agency has now filed suit i n a Utah state court 
making the same claims and asking the same relief that it did in the federal cuurt action: 
Le., that ICPC does not apply ro birthraothers who come to Utah, thsu njive birth and 
relinquish the child to a Utah Agency. 
In maldng the prcjsept analysis it will be necessary to make some reft rcfice to the position 
taken in Secretariat Opinion #49, but primary attention will be focus**] en the facts of the 
particular ease which you have now asked us to analyse. You alread / have in your 
possession other materials supplied by the Secretariat relating to the issue of binhmothers 
who cross state lines, give birth and then relinquish their newly bom in£ux& 
ANALYSIS. A firs: vexing question is what significance should be attached to the 
temporary injunction issued by the federal court during the proceeding pending b<fOfe it. 
The defendant stipulated to the injunction, but that does not fully explain its proper scope. 
If the case in the federal court had involved the interpretation and enforcement of an 
ordinary state law, and if all affected parties w«n* within the State of Utah, it aught have 
been reasonable to apply the injunction to any acts which theplainiif *ioight perform in 
obeying or disregarding ICPC. However, ICPC is an interstate compact Ii govern* the 
activities, rights and obligations of persons, srates and their subdivisions in p:«rtieipaiing 
in placement of children between and among the states. In the case the facts of which are 
presented above, a Pennsylvania birthmother was involved. Also, the administration of 
the Compact by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as by t) a State of Utah, was 
and is involved. Similarly, if applied to other instances of birthmothitfs coining, to Utah 
to relinquish their children to the Agency, the interests of birthmother, .states, 
prospective adoptive parents in states other than Utfah Would be affected. Neither the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nor the Pennsylvania birthmother were parties to the 
federal suit brought by the Agency and in which the temporary injunction wis issued. 
Also, neither the State of Colorado nor the Colorado prospective adooiivc parents wctc 
parties to thai suit. 
Another curious feature of the injunction is that it appear* to havehtttt issued before the 
federal court determined that it had jurisdiction over the case. In fac „ the federal court 
subsequently dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. Since the federal i;oun found 
that it did not have jurisdiction (or Would not exercise it), the validity uf the injunction is 
open to question. 
It is possible to interpret the injunction (to which the State of Utah striated) as an 
undertaking not to take licensing action against the Agency during tta ilxne when the 
injunction was in effect. If this intetpretation is applied, it should bv considered that the 
Agency could not have ICPC eqfor<«d against it by a licensing pmc fading for bringing 
JUL~89-2082 09142 DCFS ADMIN 801 S3B 3993 P.89'16 
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the Pennsylvania birthmother 10 Utah and accepting a relinquishment without complying 
with ICPC 
In any eyem;, the temporary injunction cannot be said to have been in force ffrr more Than 
a periodending with the dismissal of the federal suit It was DOT in fcrcc when the 
Agency submitted on ICPC-100A to the Utah Compact Office for transmittal to 
Colorado, nor could ii possibly be binding on the State of Colorado or the Srste of 
Pennsylvania as (hey seek to pursue tbeir administration of ICPC. 
At best, wc can say that Utah could not suspend or revoke the Agenc y's cHiki-placing 
license for having accepted a relinquishment from the Pennsylvania liirthrooMier 
Whether the facts support the proposition that the Agency (by the re] oqaishmatf) 
acquired a right to place the child-—a right which Colorado or Pennsylvania fttust 
recognize—is a different question. 
Arricie ID of ICPC requires that a sending agency provide the state into whicft it proposes 
to make a placement with a statement showing that it has authority tc ra;*ke the proposed 
placement. Colorado sppareurly determined that the relinquishment A/as insufficient to 
confer such authority on the Agency because the placement of the child with the Utah 
Agency was made without using ICPC. It sent the Request for Place neat (ICPC-100A) 
to Fen&sylvania. That ante has demanded ttal die birthmother sign t form and provide 
infotmation before it will begin an ICPC procedure to have die child placed in another 
Stale (presumably either Utah or Colorado), feoth Pennsylvania and Colorado take the 
position that cases in which birthmothers go to a receiving state to & /c birth ynd 
relinquish the child to an agency in the receiving state are instances t > *bicb the 
Compact applies. 
A suit in a Utah State court is not an appropriate means for contesting rhe action of 
Colorado of Pennsylvania. Obviously, neither of those states is subject to thu jurisdiction 
of a Utah court. This would be true even if the suit recently begun m a Utah court 
contesting the applicability of ICPC to cases such as the present one tiitf already been 
decided in favor of Ate Agency. However, the federal suit making si tular allegations was 
dismissed and the Utah ease has only just begun. 
We are told that the plaintiffs may include the alleged grievance con<;cming ihe 
Pennsylvaniabirthmother and her child in the pending state coun suit. The complaint 
fUrnished to us a week ago does not do so. It merely contends that Secretariat Opinion 
#49, holding that expectant mothers and persons in receiving states who make 
arrangements to have them come to the receiving slate, deliver a chi<d there, and then 
surrender it for adoption, is inapplicable io such persons. However, fee presume that the 
plaintiffs could add the Pennsylvania birthmother episode to their cr hip I aim 
In any event, there is a practical question which should be addressee by the Utah 
Department, the Agency, and any others involved with the welfare c f the child. What is 
to become of thai child? We are not told who is caring for the child flow. But whatever 
the present Arrangement! it must contain legal uncertainties. The pmpcr objective should 
i>-i 
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be TO obtain a permanent placement for the child, which will satisfy is need-?—most 
likely adoption. 
By filing an ICPC-100 A with che Utah Deputy Carapace Adnzinistra or prop vising 
placement of the child with a Colorado couple, the Agency has asserted that it has 
custody sufficient to pLace the child. Whether this is a correct position depends on one's 
view of the temporary injunction issued by the federal court and nov no lender in affect. 
We have suggested that ir might be interpreted only to have given ih; Agency immunity 
from adverse action an its license during the lime when the injunction was in force. 
However, that might be unduly harsh so far as the Pennsylvania birctaK'ther and her child 
are concerned, The Agency and the other parties then inv&Ned may in flood faith have 
believed that no adverse acrion would be taken against the Agency o * ihe hinhmother and 
the child by giving the child into the custody of the Agency while thi? injunction was in < 
effect. Since the course of events may have produced uncertainty as To vhe precise effect 
of the injunction, the best course might be to seek adoption of die ch Id by a Utah couple 
and not to raise any further questions with regard to that particular e; so. 
The Pennsylvania hinhmother situation is typical of one kind of effb -t to ev&de ICPC. 
Some attorneys and agencies frequently arrange with expectant mothers to come from 
their home suites to the state of the anomey or agency, or to some oclier jurisdiction 
where they have found couples who wish to adopt a child. The birth no:her delivers her 
child in the state to which she has been brought and surrenders the if fane, either to the 
agency or directly to the prospective adoptive parents. The position Alcon by the attorney 
or agency is that the binh and the placement have taken place wixhin die sam* state. The 
placement is thus claimed to be intrastate in character and ICPC themfere does not apply. 
Article U (d) of the Compact, defining 'placement'* as the "arrangement for [tie care of a 
child/1 is ignored. The Act that in almost all of such cases some or si) of the negotiations 
for the transaction take place while the expectant mother is still in her home *tate, or in 
some state other than the one where physical custody of the child is to he trtiqsferred, is 
also ignored. We are invited to look at the process as being nothing nore then the 
mechanical transfer of an infant from one party to another in a single location. The 
meaning of the entire transaction is not considered. The reasons why ihe stales have 
entered into m interstate compact to protect children who are proposed to be placed in 
states other than (hat of the original parent or custodian are also purpo.se ly o\ erlooked, 
The efforts of the plaintifft in the case originally dismissed, by the fe la*l court and now 
filed in a Utah court are relevant to a full understanding of the Pennsylvania birthmother 
episode and *qy administrative action or litigation which may devekip from it As noted 
at the beginning of this letter, the reason why mors attention has not bet-ji paid to die 
litigation already commenced is that the Secretariat responded at an surlier time to a Utah 
request concerning the likelihood of litigation. However, since we have now seen the 
complaint in the case recently filed, a few comments on ir may be useful, 
I, The Complaint asserts that Secretariat Opinion U*9 is nor law in Jtsh. Tuis is true. 
Opinions of the Secretariat are issued to assist state officials and others with questions 
concerning the Compact, its interpretation, administration and enforcement. They arc 
l - N C i 
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advisory opinions. But because of the experience and expertise of rhe Association and its 
Secretariat, The Secretarial Opinions have achieved standing as autnontativ.* expositions 
of the law on the points with which they deal It is submitted that :iecrettriat Opinion 
#49 is a sound interpretation of the Compact and of (he reasons foi applying ICPC to ~ 
instances in which birthmothers come to other states in order to gi^e birth and then 
surrender their children for adoption, 
2. The Intersrate Compact on the Placement of Children is charac crizcd m the 
Complaint as uniform legislation adopted by the states* This may be one ivay of saying 
that all of the states have enacted the Compact in identical language &nd that, therefore, ii 
is uniform legislation. However, the Compact is not a "Uniform 1 JLW'1 lika the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Acrt which may be modified by the 
unilateral action of a stare to suit itself ICPC is an interstate compact, winch constitutes 
a contract among the states, as well as a statute of each of them, because it is a contract 
among the states, it is necessary that it means the same thing in e;ich sratc. 
Prom the time of its first enactments forty years ago, it has been j;en<sratty understood that 
ICPC does apply to binhmother cases in the manner explained by Secretariat Opinion 
#49, The Compact Administrators so administer the Compact. U is a m\a of statutory 
construction that settled administrative practice in interpreting ar d applying a law is to be 
given great weight as to its meaning. 
CONCLUSION, If ICPC were an ordinary statute with the satiK: conteav as the Compact, 
and if it could be administered successfully without cooperation from other states, it 
would be correct to apply ICPC to the type of binhmother case *li$cussed in this letter. 
Article X of ICPC directs that the law be construed liberally to ufteetuafca its purposes. 
Its purposes are to protect children placed across state lines and to jiroteet receiving states 
from running too great risks that children unsuitably placed intc * receiving stare such as 
Utah will become public charges. To those ends, the law sets forth procedures of 
investigation and evaluation of the proposed placements by the receiving state and 
supervision during the continuance of the placements. Any int^ ipretarion of the law's 
applicability, which avoids these investigative and evaluation praceduios by the Utah 
Department of Human Resource doe* MH accomplish the law's porpo* es. In the 
Complaint for the pending state suit, the plaintiffs assert thar9 as placement agencies 
licensed under Utah law, They are responsible for protecting children. This may be true, 
but it does not invalidate or set aside the powers conferred upen the Utah Department to 
follow and enforce compliance with the procedures set our in <h* Compact law, A Utah 
child«placine agency cannot choose to have itself regulated or ly hy ttus state's Ucsnsing 
Uw and £q Iffpi^g ffc Cofppapl 
The contention is that ICPC applies only to children being brwughi into the state for 
placement. It is true that an expectant mother brings a fetus i.vo Utah, But no one is 
interested in placing a fetus. The meaning of such a transaction is to place a "child", 
Article U (d) of ICPC defines placement" as an "arrangement for th<: care of a child"* 
An arrangement is not limited to the act of physically transferring possession of a child 
m 
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from one custodian to another. Arrangements for the can of a child can he (and are 
often) made before the child is bora as wet] as afterward. 
If ICPC were meant to limit "placement" to the act of transferring possession, those 
would be the words used. The language of Article JI (d) and of the Compa: t as a whole 
is conceived to apply to the entire placement transaction from the n&gctialfctft between 
oui*of*state parties and an in-state ajgency or other placement recipient. Tfat law requires 
that the out-of-state party give notice to the receiving state of the intention io make the 
specific placement. That is to be followed by investigation of the proposed placement 
and the determination by the receiving state compact administrator um (ho placement 
does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child: i.e., a d:*xenninurion that the 
proposed placement recipient is able and suitable to tneei the need*; of the particular 
child. 
In actuality, ICPC is not an ordinary statute of Utah, The Utah enictioe&t is a law which 
establishes a contract with all the other slates providing for agreec, triform methods of 
protecting children and receiving siates in placement Transactions *hich bagin in one 
state and aire consummated in another state. The law (and the contrail which it 
establishes) cannor be fulfilled unless all die states party to it and (heir inhabitants 
observe its terms. Tfojsr the fact that an states have for a long period of y^sis understood 
ICPC to apply to cases such as that of the Pennsylvania birth&other needs to be 
recognized. The Utah Compact Administrator and other cognnsaui Utah officials have 
shared that understanding for the quarter century since Utah enacted the Compact 
The dase of the Pennsylvania binhmothcr is peculiar only in char shfc cam e to Utah, gave 
birth and relinquished her child to the Agency durihg the period *twn At; federal court's 
temporary injunction was ostensibly in effect. For that reason, die suggestion made 
earlier in this lener for handling this single case may be appropr ate. Bus in all other 
respects this case is typical of an inappropriate way to attempt circumveution of the 
XTompacr? ICPC spplfc* *» Sti*!1 T*«f * 
Finally, it may be helpful to comment on the contention in (be r lamdifc' Complaint that 
to apply ICPC to caies such as arc diaeiwed War* weald interfrru with n birthmother's 
constitutionally protected right to travel That constitutional question vas extensively 
discussed in materials sent to you some months ago. In particular, we call your attention 
to our Analysis of Florida Depanment of Health and Rehabilitaiori Services v. Friends of 
Children. The memo which we wrote to Swn A£h4aum has rc.ulied in the Florid* 
Depanment abandoning its previous belief that ii was bound fc / * e Friends of Children 
Opinion. Briefly, the point is that ICPC 4oes not regulate anyone's right to travel. 
t O *N 
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Expectant mothers, and anyone else wishing to travel from ant sure t.» another may also 
da so in, order to accomplish a Uwjul placement of a child, TC'FC only regulates the 
placement of children across state lines, Ii prescribes the aepj which placers and orhers 
must take to protect children when interstate placements are mad,:, 
I hope thai this mibrmarioh is helpful to you. 
Sincerely, 
Mitchell Wendell, Ph.D., J.D. 
Enclosure: Ashdo*n letter dated 8/29/01 
1 - i I 
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American Public Human Services Association 
Assffciation of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placwnnnt of Children 
August 29, 2001 
Mr. Sum Ashdown 
Compact Administrator 
Interstate Compact Office 
Family Safety Program 
Florida Department of Children & Families 
1317 Vmewood Blvd. 
Tallahame, tforida 32399-0700 
Dear Sam: 
Thanks vety much for your prompt mention to our memos in the Georgia Horidu-Iown 
siruadan. Since you and your Counsel will be considering the court matter-, perhaps it would 
be well for you to share this letter with your Counsel. 
We agree with almost everything you write in your August 27 e-mwL Thai u why we have 
advised Sarah Stark TO accept the ICPC-1DDA from Florida and process d< c±se. 
On the murer of ainorneys and agencies paying birthmothfcr's medical enemies, ICPC has 
no provisions. If a state's applicable laws forbid or otherwise regulate the payment of such 
medical expenses, chfcy should be applied and the offending party subject* d to whatever 
penalties the state law contains. 
The part of your me*s*ge chat r*iac? s problem *s ^mt which suggests the child b? fully 
protected by Florida law. You point our that upon the birth, a birth ceraf ,e<Lte wa? obtained 
and the child was turned over to Ac Florida Agency in accordance with Florida law IQ?C is 
npw being used to make a placement from Florida to Iowa. 
You suggest that since ICHJD js in be liberally eonssued (Article X), it is proper \y> Substitute 
the protections that are now available under Other Florida laws and prorvrtlures tor those 
which would have been applicable under ICFC 
But the use of ICPC is mandatory. (Article IXL (a).) It was a violation of the Compact for tne 
birthmother to go to Florida under ch* circumstances of thw case and chsre co hare 
surrendered Her child without a prior favorable determination pursuant to Ajmek III (d)< 
Ar\ *lf<fi*ie of me American Pubbe Hvm*-n K*fvt<** AsscxMuan, repfeitnimg oufclic nufflsn • W-MI « iiri-S 1930 
H10 first Jwei-NE Suit* SCO. Washington, 0C 200Q2^2S? * (202) S82-01Q0 » fac 1202! IBMS". i j hitpV,tf*rtapnsM»B 
JUL-89-2002 09:44 DCPS ADMIN 831 S38 3993 P.15/16 
The implication in your statements is that the Florida Agency is a duly licensed and a 
sadaftcrory one. But it might have been otherwise- The proposed Florida recipient of the 
infant could have been an individual of unsuitable character or a "fly-by-ni*ht'# agtacy, A 
timely ICPC-100A from Georgia to the Florida CompacT Office would have given 
opportunity to ascertain the situation before the placement with the AgenCy was ir,ide and 
for you to approve or dfeny the placement, in accordance with the facts as -<<u fbuiid and 
evaluated than. 
As you know, ICPC is a conwet among the states as veil as statutory la* in each rate. The 
states have agreed rhat ICPC procedures are the ones to be used in intercut* placements. 
Liberal construction of the Compact does not mean that in each case one 5i-j*; can 
determine whether ICPC or some other stature of the state is to be used to provide 
protection for the child, liberal construction means thai die Compact should be construed 
so as to Afford protection of TCPC to as many interstate cases as possible. 
Another purpose of ICPC is to protect the interests of the states involved. In this instance, 
you apparently believe that the child will not be "dumped" on Florida or, Did: if something 
goes wrong, eh* Agency can actually be held liable to produce a result satisfactory in your 
scare. Bur there are cases in which it would be otherwise. 
In addition 10 the legal reasons for requiring compliance vtith ICPC in the jirthmoiher cases* 
there is a practical necessity. If attorneys, agencies, placement recipients in J o h&i are given 
die opportunity » decide whether to comply with the Compact and when to satisf) only die 
laws of Florida (other dhan ICPC), many will decide m ignore the Compact. Ve alri.ady 
know that a substantial number of attorneys and agencies solicit pregnant women to come to 
them and surrender rheir children. They often do so spocifieally ro circumxew ICPC 
Among those who act in this way arc people who are questionable as placement reiipientf-
Compact administrators and other state officials should not encourage evasion. Payment; of 
die birthmother's medical expenses or giving her other compensation is nr* the only vice. 
Avoidance of prior home studies and evaluations is equally serious. 
In your present instance with Iowa, there is at least the fact that ICPC is b mitf user! to 
determine the suirabiliry of the preadoptwe placement in Towa. But if the |k\U rice, which 
Florida has been following, Is continued, the result also will be to continue, allowing pregnant 
women from Georgia and elswherfe to come to Florida and to release then; infant: to 
Florida placement recipients. In such case*, neither your Deparroent nor a*y othtir public 
officials will have had an opportunity to check the proposed placements. 
Because of its specific facts (including the current and long standing Florida interpretation), 
the Secretariat agrees that Iowa should process this current case. Howeve\ if Florida sees fit 
to change its view to conform to the practice and interpretation in other .'jftttts* ICPC can 
and should be applied in future cases. Of course, it would be appropriate to pubheiae the 
change so that everyone would have a reasonable opportunity to know w ™t &* l^ w U and 
to comply. 
\ 1 1 . 
• flAJJ %w<£ XQ-*»^ r- i i 
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As suggested in Dennis'* coxnmunicadon of Augusr 27,1 beiieve it will b; hulpfij] fof us to 
hold a telephone discussion involving Dennis, you and me. Certainly, thee* should be a 




p.su Whac I have sajd about birthmochers coming inro Fbrida also pecrair s tw birrhmothers 
leaving Florida and going to ill of the other states. For the reasons preset iv,d in our memo 
to you of August 27, the "right to travel11 is not a valid afgument against r enuring 
compliance with the Compact However, under the interpretations ti/hich Honda currently 
uses, Florida pr&gnant women should be able ro engagfc in the sam* practice (of i ourse, ai 
advised by their attorneys nag adopdon agencies} in other states* 
l O v l 
4.2 
ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION 
Article I. Establishment 
The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 
hereinafter referred to as "the Association", is hereby established. 
Article II. Purposes and Functions 
The Association \s for the purpose of facilitating administration of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children and considering, formulating and promulgating rules and regulations as 
contemplated in Article VII of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. In addition, the 
Association may: 
(a) Consider problems relating to the interjurisdictional placement of children from or to states 
party to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. 
(b) Recommend procedures and remedies for child placement problems and any related 
matters of child care, supervision and disposition: including but not limited to changes in 
administrative practice and law. 
(c) Develop and promulgate forms for use in the administration of the Interstate Compact on 
the Placement of Children. 
(d) Facilitate acquaintance, cooperation, consultation and exchange of information among and 
between the officials who serve as Compact Administrators and their agencies. 
(e) To do all other things necessary, appropriate or incidental to its affairs. 
Article III. Membership 
The members of the Association shall be the Compact Administrators from the party states and such 
Deputy Compact Administrators as may have been appointed in accordance with the laws and 
procedures of the state involved. 
Each party state shall be entitled to one vote which shall be cast by the Compact Administrator from 
that state, if present and by a Deputy Administrator from the state, if the Compact Administrator is 
not present No Compact Administrator or Deputy Compact Administrator shall be entitled to 
participate in the business of the Association as a member, unless there is on file with the Association 
Secretariat written notice of the identity and appointment of said Administrator or Deputy and unless 
such appointment has not been superseded, revoked, or rendered inoperative because the 
Administrator or Deputy no longer holds an office or employment in the state government involved. 





Article V. Meetings 
The annual meeting of the Association shall be held at such time and place as shall be determined by 
the Executive Committee. Special meetings may be held on call of the President at such time and 
place as he shall determine, or by demand in writing addressed to the Secretariat by the Compact 
Administrator or Deputy Administrator representing not less than 1/3 of the party states. Notice of 
the annual meeting shall be sent to all Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators 
by mail, at least: thirty days in advance of the meeting. Notice of special meetings shall be the same as 
for an annual meeting, except that it may be on ten days notice and shall be accompanied by an 
agenda setting forth in reasonable detail the business proposed to be transacted. 
Article VI. Officers 
(a) The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice President and Treasurer and 
shall be chosen from among the members of the Association. A vacancy in an office shall occur 
whenever the office-holder resigns therefrom or ceases to be a members of the Association. 
(b) The President shall perform the duties and have the prerogatives customarily inherent in 
the office of the President, including presiding at meetings and having general responsibility for the 
administration of the Association. The President shall be Chairman of the Executive Committee and 
shall be an ex officio member of all other committees -^ f the Association unless otherwise specifically 
ordered by the Association. At its 1999 Annual Meeting, however, the Association shall elect the 
President, Vice President and Treasurer and one member of the Executive Committee to two-year 
terms and four members of the Executive Committee to one-year terms. Thereafter, the Association 
shall elect officers and Executive Committee members to serve two-year terms as the respective 
terms expire. The President shall not be elected to consecutive terms. The Vice President, Treasurer 
and non-officer members of the Executive Committee shall not serve more than two consecutive 
terms. 
(c) The Vice President shall perform the duties, have the prerogatives, and assume the 
responsibilities of the President during any time when the President, on account of absence or any 
other cause is unable to act. In the event of a vacancy in the office of President, the Vice President 
shall succeed to the office of President for the remainder of the unexpired term. 
(d) The Treasurer shall have general oversight of the funds of the Association, may require 
reports thereon from the Secretariat and shall report to the Association at its annual meeting and at 
any other appropriate times on the financial condition of the Association. 
(e) The officers of the Association and members of the Executive Committee shall serve 
two year terms. 
Article VII. Committees 
(a) The Association shall have an Executive Committee of nine members: the President, the 
Vice President, the Treasurer, the immediate past President, and five other members of the 
Association who shall be elected to the Executive Committee by the members of the Association at 
Annual Meetings. The Executive Committee shall advise with the President and the Secretariat and, 
within the policy directives of the Association, may authorize action on behalf of the Association in 
those instances where it would be inappropriate to postpone action until the next ensuring annual 
meeting or where it is impracticable to hold a special meeting. Unless a matter requiring study or 






Committee may function thereon as a general committee of the Association The Executive 
Committee shall have such other duties and may perform such other functions as the President or 
the Association may from time to time assign to it 
(b) The Association may create such standing or special committees as it may deem 
appropriate If not inconsistent with action of the Association, the President may establish one or 
more special committee/ to consider particular subjects or problems 
(c) Unless otherwise required by these Articles, or unless otherwise ordered by the 
Association, the President shall have power to appoint the Chairperson of each committee The 
Chairperson, after consulting with the President and the Secretariat, shall appoint the other members 
of his/her committee To the extent practicable, the Chairperson shall appoint members of the 
Association expressing a desire to serve on the committee The Chairperson shall promptly notify the 
President and the Secretariat of all appointments to the committee 
(d) At each Annual Meeting, the Association shall elect one person who will serve as an 
alternate member of the Executive Committee The person elected as an alternate shall be that 
person who received the next-highest number of votes to all of the persons who were elected to the 
non-officer positions on the Executive Committee The alternate member will be appointed to fill 
the unexpired term of a member of the Executive Committee whenever a vacancy occurs in the 
unexpired term of any member of the Executive Committee except for the President or Immediate 
Past President Unless such an appointment is made, the alternate member will remain inactive for 
Executive Committee affairs The President of the Association, in consultation with the members of 
the Executive Committee, will determine whether a vacancy has occurred and when such an 
appointment will be made In the event that a vacancy occurs in the position of one of the officers of 
the Association other than the President or the Immediate Past President, the President of the 
Association may appoint either an incumbent non-officer member of the Executive Committee to 
the vacated officer position or the alternate member to fill either (1) the position vacated by an 
incumbent member of the Executive Committee who assumes the vacant officer position, or (2) the 
vacant officer position A vacancy on the Executive Committee, for all positions other than the 
President or Immediate Past President, shall occur whenever a member moves from a non-officer 
position to an officer position, resigns from the Executive Committee, ceases to be a member of the 
Association, or otherwise withdraws from the activities over which the Association has authority 
In the event that the alternate member is appointed to become an active member of the 
Executive Committee, the President of the Association, in consultation with the members of the 
Executive Committee, may appoint another alternate member Such appointment shall be one of the 
un-elected candidates for a position on the Executive Committee in the immediately preceding 
election Appointments to the position of alternate member may be repeated on every occasion that 
an alternate member becomes an active member of the Executive Committee 
Article VIII Affiliation with the American Public Human Services Association 
(a) Upon approval by the American Public Human Services Association (hereinafter 
referred to as "APHSA") in accordance with its procedures, the Association shall be affiliated with 
APHSA However, regulations adopted pursuant to Article VII of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children and other implementing actions necessary or appropriate to the 
administration of said Compact in accordance with the laws of the several states shall not be subject 





(b) The Secretariat of the Association shall be provided by APHSA. Such Secretariat shall be 
responsible for keeping the records of the Association, including the minutes of the annual meeting 
and the minutes of any special meetings. The Secretariat shall attend all meetings of the Association 
and participate therein but shall not vote. The Secretariat shall perform such additional functions as 
negotiated with APHSA- APHSA is hereby designated as Sectetasiat of the Association. 
(c) Funds to include dues contributed or appropriated from any source for the specific use 
of the Association shall be held by APHSA and administered and disbursed for the benefit of the 
Association and its activities in accordance with the financial practices of APHSA. 
Article IX. Dues 
The amount of annual fees due to be paid by each party state shall be determined by the APHSA 
Board of Directors based on program plans and recommendations of the Association md after 
review and recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Association. Such amount shall be 
billed by the Secretariat and payable at the beginning of the Association's fiscal year. 
Article X- Parliamentary Authority 
It is the intent that in order to expedite business, the meetings of the Association and its committees 
shall be conducted informally. However, when necessary to the effective transaction of business or 
on demand of any member, the business of the Association shall be conducted in accordance with 
Robert's Rules of Order, Revised. 
Article XI. Adoption and Amendments 
These Articles of Organization, and any amendments thereto, may be adopted, amended, altered, 
supplemented or repealed by majority vote at any meeting of the Association, provided notice is 
given, in the same manner as provided for notices of annual meetings. A notice of a proposed 
Amendment shall contain the text of the proposed Amendment or a summary thereof sufficient to 
indicate with particularity its purpose and content. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins #4854 
Richard J. Armstrong #7461 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
S E P - 3 2002 ; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation, dba 
ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC 
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity as 
Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate 
Compact on Placement of Children and in his 
official capacity as President of the Association of 
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children; ROBIN ARNOLD-
WILLIAMS, in her official capacity as Executive 
Director of the Utah Department of Human 
Services; JANICE P. KNAPHUS, in her official 
capacity as Licensing Specialist in the Office of 
Licensing of the Utah Department of Human 
Services; the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, a governmental department of the 
State of Utah; DENNIS ESHMAN, in his official 
capacity as Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the 
Association of Administrators of the Interstate 
Compact on the Placement of Children, the 
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE 
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, and the 
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES 
ASSOCIATION, in its capacity as Secretariat of 
the Association of Administrators of the Interstate 





Civil No. 020905025 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, dba Act of Love, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., and A TLC Adoption, Inc. bring 
this second amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Michael 
Chapman, in his official capacity as Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children and in his official capacity as President of the Association of 
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Robin Arnold-Williams, 
in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human Services, Janice 
P. Knaphus, in her official capacity as a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the 
Utah Department of Human Services, the Utah Department of Human Services, a governmental 
department of the State of Utah, Dennis Eshman, in his official capacity as Manager of 
Secretariat Staff of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement 
of Children, the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children, and the American Public Human Services Association, in its capacity as Secretariat of 
the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, and 
complain and allege as follows: 
PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love 
("Act of Love") is a Utah non-profit corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the 
state of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), is a Utah 
corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the state of Utah. 
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3. Plaintiff A TLC Adoption, Inc. ("TLC") is a Utah corporation and is a 
licensed child-placing in the state of Utah. 
4. Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") is an individual residing in the 
state of Utah and, upon information and belief, has been appointed as the Deputy Compact 
Administrator responsible for coordination of all activities under the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children (Utah Code § 62A-4a-701, hereinafter "ICPC") for the state of Utah, and 
who is serving as President of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children for the years 2001 through 2003.. 
5. Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is an individual 
residing in the state of Utah and is the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human 
Services, the department of Utah government responsible for activities under the ICPC. 
6. Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is an individual residing in the 
state of Utah and is a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of 
Human Services with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies. 
7. Defendant Utah Department of Human Services (the "Department"), is the 
department, through its Division of Child and Family Services, responsible for accepting and 
reviewing information submitted in connection with placement of children across state lines 
pursuant to the ICPC, and is also responsible, through its Office of Licensing, for licensing 
adoption agencies. 
8. Defendant Dennis Eshman is an individual who is serving as Manager of 
the Secretariat Staff of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children. 
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9. The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children (the "AAICPC") is an organization based in Washington, D.C., that was 
established as an affiliate of the American Public Human Services Association (the "APHSA"). 
Its members are the Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators of each of the 
United States and territories that have adopted the ICPC. 
10. The APHSA is a nonprofit organization that is based in Washington, D.C., 
that is an affiliate of the AAICPC, and that serves as Secretariat of the AAICPC. 
11. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-4(1). 
12. Utah's Declaratory Judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-33-1, also grants this Court the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." 
Moreover, "[a]ny person... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a 
statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . 
statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-2. 
13. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7. 
14. This Court has jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants because they, 
among other things, have transacted business in this state and provided services in this state by 
giving advice and guidance to the Utah defendants as to the applicability of the ICPC on child 
placement issues generally and specifically as to Utah placement issues. 
4 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 
15. The ICPC is uniform legislation in force in all 50 states. It requires 
agencies, entities, and persons seeking to place children across state lines to obtain prior approval 
for placements. The approval process requires the party placing the child to give notice of the 
placement to the ICPC administrator and other appropriate public authorities. An evaluation of 
the suitability of the placement is performed to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to 
approve the placement. 
16. As licensed child-placing agencies, plaintiffs are charged by the state of 
Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are relinquished to 
them for adoption. Plaintiffs are required to follow certain regulations designed to protect the 
children, the birth parents, and adoptive parents in the adoption process. Thus, plaintiffs are 
charged with protecting the same interests the ICPC seeks to protect. 
17. Plaintiffs are often contacted by expectant mothers outside of the state 
who are contemplating placing their expected children for adoption. 
18. Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant 
mothers travel to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely. 
19. The children are then delivered in Utah facilities and may be placed for 
adoption through plaintiffs' agencies, although each birth mother retains the right to keep her 
baby until she actually signs a relinquishment or consent to adoption, which cannot occur until at 
least 24 hours after the baby is born. 
20. A substantial part of plaintiffs' businesses involve expectant birth mothers 
who travel to Utah to deliver their babies and to place them for adoption. 
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21. Defendants have taken the position that the ICPC must be complied with 
for an expectant mother to travel to Utah to deliver her child in Utah. 
22. Defendants take their interpretation from a June 30,1986 opinion issued 
by the Secretariat of the AAICPC, Secretariat Opinion #49 ("Opinion #49"). 
23. Opinion #49 does not have the force of law and has not been adopted as 
the law in Utah. 
24. In 2000, Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing and at Chapman's 
instruction, cited Act of Love for a licensing violation for failing to obtain prior approval before 
an expectant mother was brought into the state of Utah to deliver her child. The Office of 
Licensing withdrew the violation after Act of Love questioned the application of the ICPC to the 
situation. 
25. On November 21, 2001, an attorney for the Department of Human 
Services wrote to an attorney for Act of Love that "the Office of Licensing has been instructed, 
as of November 19, 2001, to enforce those [ICPC] requirements with regard to all licensed child 
placing agencies." This language referred to requiring agencies to obtain ICPC approval when 
helping an expectant birth mother travel to Utah. 
26. This letter resulted from guidance received by Arnold-Williams from an 
assistant Utah Attorney General recommending that the Department use Opinion #49 "as 
guidance for the department's regulatory actions, specifically for the Office of Licensing and the 
Division of Child and Family Services." 
27. Similarly, on December 3, 2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each plaintiff 
informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the Department "have 
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been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child 
placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth 
and place their child for adoption." 
28. Pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the 
suspension or revocation of plaintiffs' licenses as child-placing agencies. 
29. Shortly after receiving the December 3, 2001 letter, plaintiffs filed suit in 
federal court challenging the interpretation of the ICPC found in Opinion #49. That action was 
dismissed without prejudice by the federal court on jurisdictional grounds. 
30. During the pendency of the federal court action, defendants stipulated to a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ICPC in situations where an expectant mother 
comes to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption. The federal court signed that 
injunction on February 6,2002. 
31. On March 1, 2002, during the pendency of the federal action and while the 
federal injunction was in place, Knaphus sent a corrective action plan and a finding of a licensing 
violation to Adoption Center of Choice for violating the December 3, 2001 letter. 
32. During a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment in the federal 
action held June 7, 2002, counsel for defendants represented to the federal court that under the 
ICPC the state of residence of an expectant birth mother does not need to give approval for a 
birth mother to come to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption with a Utah adoption 
agency. Counsel represented that only approval of the Utah ICPC administrator needs to be 
obtained in such situations and that the state of residence of the birth mother simply needs to be 
notified that the birth mother is in or is coming to Utah to deliver. 
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33. Counsel for defendants also represented to the federal court that a Utah 
adoption agency can sign an ICPC 100A form as a "sending agency" if the Utah adoption agency 
is bringing a birth mother into Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption with the Utah 
adoption agency. 
34. Following the federal court summary judgment hearing, a situation arose 
with Act of Love concerning a baby who was born in Utah in May, 2002, to a non-resident birth 
mother, and relinquished to Act of Love on or about May 24, 2002. The baby was born and 
placed with Act of Love during the pendency of the federal court injunction against enforcement 
of the ICPC in such cases, and was placed with an adoptive family from Colorado. 
35. In the process of obtaining approval from the Colorado ICPC 
administrator, a question was raised about approval for the birth mother's travel from 
Pennsylvania to Utah to have her baby. Rather than hassle with bureaucrats over interpretation 
of the ICPC, Act of Love decided to proceed as counsel for defendants had represented to the 
federal court the ICPC process should work. Act of Love signed the ICPC papers as sending 
agency and submitted an ICPC package to Chapman as the Utah administrator for approval. This 
was done on the basis of Chapman's counsel's representation to the federal court that approval 
of the Pennsylvania ICPC administrator was not required. 
36. Chapman, however, contrary to his counsel's representations to the federal 
court, said Act of Love could not sign as sending agency, and said approval of, not just 
notification to, the Pennsylvania administrator is required. 
37. Instead, Chapman placed approval of the placement into Colorado on hold 
pending approval from Pennsylvania. 
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38. Approval from the Pennsylvania administrator was significantly delayed 
because Pennsylvania requires birth parents to sign a particular form peculiar to Pennsylvania. 
When presented with the Pennsylvania form to sign, the birth parents refused to sign and retained 
an attorney to try to get their child back from Act of Love. Only recently did the birth mother, 
but not the birth father to whom she is married, agree to sign the form. 
39. Chapman, however, required the birth mother, rather than Act of Love to 
sign the ICPC 100A form as the sending agency, rather than allowing Act of Love to sign as 
sending agency as Chapman's counsel represented to the federal court. Once this was done, and 
based only on the birth mother's signature, Pennsylvania finally gave its approval for the 
placement, but it took nearly two months to complete and increased Act of Love's costs in the 
adoption, as well as the real costs expended by the adoptive family as they had to wait for 
approval to take the child to Colorado. 
40. Plaintiffs believe that while this specific situation may be resolved, 
because of defendants' interpretations of the ICPC, this type of situation is clearly capable of 
repetition while evading review. Only because Act of Love sought to protect the interests of the 
adoptive family and did as Chapman requested did approval come. Had Act of Love sued on the 
facts presented and awaited an outcome, it is likely the placement would have been disrupted. 
Yet, had Chapman done as his counsel represented to the federal court, the situation likely would 
have been resolved several weeks ago. 
41. As Act of Love was attempting to obtain approval of the Pennsylvania to 
Utah to Colorado situation, upon information and believe, Chapman requested advice from the 
AAJCPC. On July 9, 2002, a lawyer with the AAICPC sent Chapman a seven-page letter 
9 
reiterating that organization's adherence to Opinion #49, offering advice concerning the specific 
situation presented, and opining that this lawsuit can have no effect on interpretation of the ICPC 
outside of Utah. This letter was not provided to any of plaintiffs by Chapman. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
42. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the 
same here by this reference. 
43. The ICPC applies only when a "child" from another state is brought or 
sent to any other state for placement in foster care or preliminarily for a possible adoption. 
44. The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is 
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." ICPC, Article 11(1). The definition 
of "child" in the ICPC does not include a fetus or an unborn child. 
45. The ICPC further requires the party placing a child across state lines to 
give notice, containing, among other things, the name, date, and place of birth of the child, and 
the identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian. ICPC, Article 111(2). 
46. When an expectant mother travels to Utah, the "child" to be placed for 
adoption is not "brought" or "sent" under the ICPC. The child is, therefore, not brought to Utah 
across state lines and the ICPC does not apply. 
47. Indeed, until the child is relinquished to one of plaintiffs' agencies, the 
child is not subject to placement and remains in the legal custody and control of the birth mother. 
48. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15.1 provides that the ICPC only 
must be complied with in an adoption proceeding when the child is born out of state. 
10 
Plaintiffs are entitled t< i declaration from this Court finding 'that 'the 
ICPC does not apply to situations where an expectant mothei travels to Utah and delivers a child 
here. 
^U/UiND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
50. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate (lie 
s a m e 
51. The interpretation ot the ICPC made by Opinion #49 and adopted by 
defendants alio r iringes uu tru - $.,.• , i ai. i \pet 
intent • * * -r.r^ses-i rvr^11, <** ''* ™;Uaiii niuthn s iraveling state to state In 
requiring compliance with the !( P( when the expectant mother desires to travel to another Mate 
to o,
 >r.... „*.: _ . and in pi c idnptinn 
52. Expectant mothers from I Itah do not have to go through these same ICPC 
approval procedures to place their children with plaintiffs' s agencies, 
53. ' Because < tpinn HI, f!4c>'s interpretation of the ICPC and the consequent 
requirements de1 /ndants have imposed upon plaintiffs impair expectant mothers' constitutional 
n-<hw k* *ra \e i . . >..UTpreia . ... ' * • •? 
acting in concert with diem, should be enjoined from enforcing the interpretation., 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
54. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the 
sam«.- here by this reference. 
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55. Article III of the ICPC only requires approval of the "receiving state" for a 
placement of a child across state lines to occur. Nowhere in the ICPC does it state that approval 
of the "sending state" is required, and nowhere in the ICPC is "sending state" defined. 
56. Article III of the ICPC also provides that only the requirements of the 
ICPC and the applicable laws "governing the placement of children" of the "receiving state" 
need to be complied with when bringing a child across state lines to place for adoption. Nowhere 
in the ICPC does it state that the laws governing the placement of children of the state of 
residence of the child need to be complied with. 
57. Article 11(2) of the ICPC defines "sending agency" as anyone "which 
sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state." The definition of 
"sending agency" is broad enough to include a Utah adoption agency bringing a child from 
another state into Utah. 
58. Plaintiffs ask the Court for a declaration that only the approval of the 
"receiving state" must be obtained under the ICPC, that the "sending state" does not need to sign 
for or approve a pleicement of a child across state lines, that only the laws of the "receiving state" 
governing the placement of children need to be complied with under the ICPC and not the laws 
of the sending state, and that a Utah adoption agency can be a "sending agency" under the ICPC 
when the agency brings a child from another state for purposes of placement for adoption. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunctive Relief) 
59. Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the 
same here by this reference. 
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60. < to Ik Iiiitgtiai.it o! Ilic 
ICPC and Utah law, and una* .\cvemhei 19, 2001, tim mtu^ .v^v . , .,ad not been enforced in 
I Jtah. 
6 1 . ( '>«VU • ^ "r • , 
as set .forth above, are cmitrarv u- ihe lansniaue of the H PC 
62. "Ihcse interpretations aic tx-ing VIWUK -u . \ i.ic ; loJj ^lendciiit:* liinii.^h 
requirements placed upon licensed child-p] u ;nc ^qencies such as plaintiffs. 
63. A significant part or plaintiffs' businesses involve non-resident, expectant 
1 
64. Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if defendants' interpretations found in 
Opinion #49 and elsewhere are enforced against a ^r>, 
65. Plaintiffs have no adequate ' •*• il (cninl\ -iml imiil rrsuil In Ihi rqml.ihlr 
remedy of injunctive relief, 
66. 1 he I Jtah defendants, and. all those acting in concert "v\ ith defendants, 
sl10Uld be enjoined, preliminarily and permanently, from enforcing interpretations of the ICPC 
inconsistent with the declarations of this Court, as sought by plaintiffs.. 
67. . The A 'Mi "PC (lel« 11«I-• inI • .iiiini ill! Ihi r mlHif1 mi rnm nil v illi ilcfendiiiils 
should be e:njoined, preliiiiiiiarily and permanently, from enforcing interpretations of the ICPC 
inconsistent with the declarations of this Cour t as sought b) plaintiffs 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays for the following relief: 
a. For a declaration that the ICPC does not apply when an expectant mother 
t 
X J 
b. For a declaration that ICPC approval by the Utah defendants does not need 
to be obtained for a child that is born in Utah to a non-resident birth mother. 
c. For a declaration that defendants' interpretation of the ICPC violates an 
expectant birth mother's right to travel. 
d. For a declaration that the ICPC does not require signature or approval of 
the sending state for a placement to be made across state lines. 
e. For a declaration that the ICPC does not require compliance with the laws 
of the sending state when a placement is made across state lines into Utah. 
f. For a declaration that under the ICPC, any one of plaintiffs could sign as a 
"sending agency" when they bring a child across state lines for purposes of placing the child for 
adoption. 
g. For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Utah 
defendants, and all those acting in concert with them, from enforcing interpretations of the ICPC 
inconsistent with declarations made by this Court. 
h. For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the AAICPC 
defendants, and all those acting in concert with them, from continuing to support and/or advocate 
or advance interpretations of the ICPC inconsistent with declarations made by this Court. 
L For attorney fees and costs of this action as may be allowed by law. 
j . For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
14 
ink 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S^ . Jenkins ~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ day of September, 2002. a true and • 
copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COh ir. . 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage rrenaid, to: 
Craig L. Barlow, Esq. 
Joel A. Ferre, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins #4854 
Richard J. Armstrong #7641 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
•uJiSfRJCT COURT 
02 OCT 16 PML»: 35 
•A i r LAKE DEPARTMENT 
•.DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020905025 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Plaintiffs respectfully move the Court for entry of partial summary judgment in 
their favor on the application of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC") to 
an expectant mother traveling interstate to Utah to deliver her child and potentially place the 
child for adoption. The grounds for this motion are that the plain language of the ICPC cannot 
be interpreted to apply in such a situation. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law in support that is filed 
contemporaneously. 
DATI'.I Mlus \. October. 7002. 
'JD CRAPO LLC 
Larry 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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\-na 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ifo day of October, 2002, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was hand delivered, to: 
Craig L. Barlow, Esq. 
Joel A. Ferre 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.OI. Box 140857 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Attorney for Utah Defendants 
Michael W. Homer 
Paul C. Farr 
Suitter Axland 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 45101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
4ff^r> 
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Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 
Secretariat Opinion 10 - June 30,1986 
Expectant Mothers^Jlrayel lo Another State for Bii th 
Can a birthmother who comes to State A from another state in order to give birth and then 
places her child with a State A couple thereby avoid application of Interstate Compact on 
the Placement of Children? It \s suggested that this is consciously dene on some 
occasions wiih the JeLberaie indention of avoiding the Compact,,. However, If the 
Compact is not circumvented by this maneuver,- should the birthmother fill out an iCPC-
100A beforehand9 Can State A process the placement before the child is delivei ed? 
There are a variety of reasons why people sometimes seek to covert interstate placements 
into intrastate placements. There is sometimes a desire to save the work, cf considering 
the laws of the other state. If the prospective adoptive parents are using a local attorney, 
they or he may wish to accomplish the entire matter without the need for involving a 
lawyer in the other state. Usually these reasons have little or nothing to do with 
protecting the interests of the child. In fact, circumventing laws and procedures 
specifically designed to protect children in interstate situations may expose both the child 
and the others invoived in risks. Neveitheiesi, the desire to avoid regulation or to shorten 
procedures is often a powerful motive, further, there is sometimes anxiety lest 
observance of protective laws may bring to light some reason why the placement and 
adoption sho* ilci. not occui ., 
If the child is a day old when the birthmother brings it across the state line to State A and 
delivers it to the attorney or to the prospective adoptive parents, there is no doubt that an 
interstate placement occurs and that the procedures of the Compact must be followed. 
The Compact applies to "bringing" a child to another state for placement ^preliminary to a 
possible adoption,,," 
It u.\. birthm* ther comes io Stair \ *me day before delivery M .. ?:\ u-st*-* af*e? gK'i- *, 
birth, lurm .c i raid o\er \ <;i anoi-iev or the prospective adoptive parents, it is askec 
whether the iaw should not consider the transaction u he intiastate in ; har~~te~ --v -
i.biect to lK i-r. \£i-\~ ; " r - ; H t r ^ ; i - ' -'«*-' • 
W here a ch-A-i ;:• ^arsiened from the rusiodx -;-i t * "M: ;i »othei to another party at or very 
soon after the- n- m ..• r, A virtual ' . v. stv that the arrangements for the placement have 
occurred " re the birth and in specific anticipation of it. Where the State A couple is the 
recipient of the child and the birthmother is the relinquishing party, it would be sham to 
describe the transaction as anything other than the placement by a State X "sending 
agency" with a couple in another state (State A). 
«•% 
Secretariat Opinion 49 - June 30, 1986 , ,
 n, 
3.106 
Some pregnant women go to maternity homes when they believe that they will place their 
bab.es for adoption or when they are undecided as to what they will do. Frequently these 
women enter the maternity home a considerable time before birth of the child is expected 
The home may be tn their own state of residence or in another state. In the latter 
instances, the circumstances of the particular case may need to be looked at specifically to 
determine whether they are such as to make the placement of the child an interstate matter 
or not In those instances too, an important motivation of the birthmother can be to be 
away from her own community during a difficult period. However, that has no bearing on 
whether the placement should or should not be considered an interstate one in character. 
In other instances, women go to hospitals in another state merely to use the medical 
faculties for the birth of their children. This is especially frequent in metropolitan areas 
situated at state boundaries. The population of the entire area use the medical and hospital 
resources of the region to their best advantage and convenience, without regard to the 
state .me. Similar circumstances also can be expected wherever a hospital is near a state 
boundary In such instances, it is not appropriate to regard the surrender of a newly born 
infant by the birthmother to prospective adoptive parent who live in her own state of 
residence as interstate placement requiring application of the Compact. This is true even 
when the physical transfer of the child occurs at the hospital in the other state All of the 
pre and post transfer aspects of the placement relate to the single state in which both the 
birthmother and the prospective adoptive parents live. 
Where the expectant mother crosses a state line as part of the placement plan and 
arrangement, the transaction should be viewed as an interstate placement. In enacting the 
Compact the intent of the state legislatures was not to make the protections of placements 
depend on mechanical manipulation of the deliverv point Such logistic calculations are 
nothing more than subterfuges and studied efforts tc avoid the interded and normal 
consequences of the law. Article X of the ICPC directs that the Compact be "liberally 
construed to elTecuate its purposes". As set forth in Article I and evidenced in the entire 
pattern of the procedures and requirements specified throughout the Compact, the 
emphasis is on the interstate character of the arrangements. If the arrangement process is 
interstate, placement is interstate. The definition of "placement" in Article II also supports 
this interpretation. 
There is some difference of view among the states on whether any work can be done on 
the processing of interstate placements before the child is bom. Some take the position 
that until the birth actually occurs, there is no assurance that there will be an infant and 
that the full circumstances on the basis of which the placement should be evaluated are not 
knowable. 
We prefer another approach. The time at which the birth is expected is known. The 
woman's intention to surrender her child is also present, even if there can be a change of 
Secrelaii.il < >|iiiii"»n I i m MI HI M I 
mind up to the very moment v. 1 icn a relii iquishinent is executed, and even during the grace 
period that ma ny states allov. for reconsideration, If the prospective adoptive parents are 
known and the arrangements are in progress, their personal qualifications and the home 
environment into which the infant will go can also be studied and evaluated. If all of this 
is done before the birth occurs, all that will normally remain is to determine the condition 
of the child and to make a judgment as to whether the already evaluated prospective 
adoptive parents and their environment are not contrary to the best interests of the child. 
Consequently, we advise that where a state is willing to do so, it should accept di\ ICPC-
100A and should do most of the processing before the birth occurs. This cai shorter, and 
simplify the post birth work and can make the period before approved recipients of a 
preadoptive placement can receive custody of the child. This can. do much to reduce the 
pressures for neglect and. violation of law in the interest, of speed 
*s * ^ 
December 3, 2001 
USA^I o i« •« * DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES M
^**°<^J I OFFICE OF LICENSING 
Hobin Arnold-Williaiua § 
Rmwiiv* Director £j 
l&fH^u^K* S 130 Norm 200 wost, Suit© 303 
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 | (801)538-4242 
g An equal Opportunity employer 
Ms. Kathleen Kunkel, President 
A Act of Love 
9561 South 700 East, Suite 101 
Sandy, UT 84094 
RE: Applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to child 
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their 
children for adoption. 
Dear Ms, Kunkel: 
The Department of Human Services has received guidance from the Attorney General's Office 
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat 
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact 
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for 
adoption. A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and reference. 
The Office of Li<?ert$ing and the Division of Child and Family Services have been directed, as of 
November 19, 2001, to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning 
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give 
birth and place their child for adoption. 
If you have questions or require further clarification regarding this matter, please feel free to call 
me at (801) 538-8222 or email me at jknaphus@hs.state,ut.us. 
Sincerely, 
fee P. Knaphus 
Licensing Specialist 
cc: Michael Chapman, DCFS/ICPC 
Alan Hayward, Licensing Supervisor 
Office of Licensing 
Reta Oram, Director 
Office of Licensing 
Enclosure 
JPK/add 





State of Utah 
DEEAKTMENT OP HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
December 3, 2001 
Maikft^Ward | t20 htorth 200 West, Suite 303 
Depuijr Dmcter | p Q Q ^ JQ^QQ 
Beta D. Oram | Sail Lake City, Utah 8414S-0SQ0 
Pixwtoif I (801)536-4242 
an equal opportunity amployar 
Mr. James C. Webb, Executive Director 
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
241 West 520 North 
Orem,UT 84057 
Mi Applicability of the Interstate Compact on 'the Placement of Children (ICPC) to ch. io 
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place the; ? 
children for adoption 
Dear Mi'. V 'el 1»>; 
The Department of Human Services has received guidance from the Attorney General's Office 
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat 
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact 
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for 
adoption. A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and. reference. 
The Office of Licensing and the Division of Child and Family Services have bcen'dirccted, as of 
November 19,2001, to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning 
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah, to give 
birth and place their child for adoption. 
If you have questions or require further clarification ..regarding this matter, please ieei tree to i a 1.1 
me at (801) 538-8222 or email me atjknaphus@hs.state.utus. 
Sincerely 
ice P. Knaphus 
Licensing Specialist 
cc: Michael Chapman, Dt>8/iClJ(: 
Alan Hayward., Licensing Supervisor 
Office of Licensing 
Reta Oram, Director 
Office of Licensing 
Enclosure 
JFK/add 
p . 0 1 






Rata D. Oram 
EhrMtor 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OP LICENSING 
120 North 200 Watt, Sulla 303 
RO. Box 46500 
Salt Laka City, Utah 84145-0500 
(801) 636-4242 
an equal opportunity tmployer 
December 3,2001 
Ms, Sandi Bumingham, Director 
A TLC Adoption 
36 West 850 South 
Layton,UT 84041 
RE: Applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to child 
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their 
children for adoption, 
Dear Ms. Bumingham: 
The Department of Human Services has received guidance from the Attorney General's Office 
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat 
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact 
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for 
adoption, A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and reference. 
The Office of Licensing and the Division of Child and Family Services have been directed, as of 
November 19,20017 to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning 
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give 
birth and place their child for adoption. 
If you have questions or require further clarification regarding this matter, please feel free to call 
mc at (801) 538-8222 or email me at iknaphustiflhs.state,utus. 
Sincerely, 
ice P. Knaphus 
Licensing Specialist 
cc: Michael Chapman, DCFS/ICPC 
Alan Hayward, Licensing Supervisor 
Office of Licensing 
Reta Oram, Director 
Office of Licensing 
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Article I. Purpose and Policy 
policy of the party . u - • • icr in die 
interstate placement of children to the end that 
(a) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum, opportunity to be 
placed in a. suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate 
qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care 
(b) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full 
opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby 
promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of'the child,, 
(c) ' rhe proper authorises of IIK \u\ir from ul ich ihe placement u> made nia\ 
obtain the most complete informant •-;*- basi- •>! ^l-i.-h t ."vaiuatr A projected 
placement before it is mad 
(d) Appropriate ]un.^ia. m,.»;,., arrangements 
promoted. 
Article IL Definitions 
As used in this compact: 
(a) "Child" means a person, who by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental 
guardianship or similar control 
(b) '"Sending agency" means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision 
of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, 
corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes 
to be sent or brought any child to another party state, 
(c) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is sent, brought, <JI ausr. P 
be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and 
whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for placement wit^ rr;* ^ 
agencies or persons. 
(d) "Placement nieai.:. ;i.c ai.aiigLiii.nl t«v the -..are <>f a ^hdd in a family free oi 
boarding home or in a child-caring agency- or instituri*u. 1 m .lot-v nt.t unlade anv 
institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective oi eph:?n< or mv institution 
primarily- ed„ Mtion;! i- c^ara^ter v^d anv hospital ^ r 'n}v* "vv- ;: i u din 
Article III. C o n d u i t - - i,< . I'layLn . 
(a- No -ending agency shall <-nd S'mg, <u cause to be *cm or brought into anv 
other party state any child tor placement m foster care or as a preliminary to a possible 
adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set 
forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the 
placement of children therein. 
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(b) Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a 
receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the 
sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state 
written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state. 
The notice shall contain: 
(1) The name, date and place of birth of the child. 
(2) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian. 
(3) The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which 
the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child. 
(4) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the 
authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made. 
(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice 
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other 
appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entided to 
receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary 
under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact. 
(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the 
receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify 
the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear 
to be contrary to the interests of the child. 
Article IV, Penalty for Illegal Placement 
The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child 
in violation of the terms of this compact, shall constitute a violation of the laws 
respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is 
located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such 
violation may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance 
with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such 
violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of 
any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which 
empowers or allows it to place, or care, for children. 
Article V. Retention of Jurisdiction 
(a) The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine 
all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, and disposition of the child 
which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the 
child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the 
concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction shall 
also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another 
location and custody pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have 
financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the 
placement. Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving 
state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein. 
10 
(b) When the sending agency is a public agency, it may e m u i 
with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state
 l 
performance of one or more services in respect of such case by the latter as agenr foi '!•• 
sending agency, 
(c) Noth ing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private charitable agency 
authorized to place children in the receiving state from performing services or acting as 
agents in that state for a private charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the 
agency in the receiving state from, discharging financial responsibility for the support and 
maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without 
relieving 'the responsibility set forth in paragraph (a) hereof, 
Article VI, Institutional Care of I Mmquent Children 
A child adjudicated delinquent may be pla^cu ... ._ -IIMHI:* < •: u'orher j ,a\ 
jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such placement :> ;' i- m.io. anles> 1R 
i hilvi is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian with op. • r.mitv t>. in-
, *. 1 prior »•> his being sent to such other party jurisdictio*' f'^r ,M,*'ft'!*j • • < \. < l 
' finds H j? 
hq^-a len cnild are not available in the sending agency's 
a ion ind 
' ' ) ^ xumA care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of rhr .. hild m--: 
w I! n * > i p i. v ., * .: n J •.«• hardship. 
ArtKk '. i. <Tnp«m Administrator 
Yhc executive head or each jurisdiction party to this compact Mian u< u. . . 
who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in hi N non ii.if 
who, acting joindy with like officers of other party jurisdictions, .hall !M\C pm\; 
p ro m ulgate * u 1 es an d i egulations to cany o ut mo re effectively th r u: r n \ s and prov 1;«<>!r 
of this compact 
Article VIIL Limitations 
This conij , -»ii,:i» -
(a) The sending ot Lnnpiiu - i a viu^ - «'ceiving stair > • i « \ .• ;... 
stepparent, grandparent, adult brutl.er or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian md 
leaving 'the 'child with any such relative or non-agency guardian in the receiving state. 
(b) Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state pursuant to 
any other interstate compact to which both the state from which the child is sent or 
brought and the receiving state a re party, or to any other agreement between said states 
which has the force of law. 
» tele DC. Enactment and Withdrawal 
11 
This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the 
consent of Congress, the Government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become 
effective with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has enacted the 
same into law., Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute 
repealing the same, but shall not take effect until two years after the effective date of such 
statute and until written notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing 
state to the Governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a party state shall 
not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this compact of any sending agency 
therein with respect to a placement made prior to the effective date of withdrawal. 
Article X. Construction and Severability 
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes 
thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any 
party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be 
affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state 
party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and" effect as to the remaining states 
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. . . w w-nvui *ih J , i:< i a Kansas resident, I iir whose child is born ir Kansas, 
comply with the procedures -f the interstate compact on placement o: childr*-
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Honorable Sam K. Bruner 
rrict Judge 
ision No. 2 
ison County Courthoi ise 
ihe, Kansas 66061 
r Judge Bruner: 
DU request our opinion on whether the interstate compact on placement: of 
Ldren applies in the case of a pregnant nonresident mother giving birth n 
3as who, before returning to her home state, consents to the adoption of the 
{ by a resident Kansan couple. You inform us that both the mother's home 
:e and Kansas have enacted the interstate compact on placement of children. 
lacted in 1985,, K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b states: 
'Interstate placements of children shall comply with the procedures contained 
:he interstate compact on p] acement of chi 3 d/r-^  ir ~"*- f^ -^ h A~ v ° " ^Q-IOHO 
amendments thereto. I,; 
lacted in 1976, K S.A 38-1202 provides in peirinent parr: 
• ARTICLE 11. Definitions 
'As used in this compact: (a) * Cl li ] d" n leaiib a ^ Lbuu wnu, u2 it-a^ . : 
Drity, is legally subject: to parental, guardianship or similar control 
'(b) 'Sending agency' means a party state, officer ->r employee thereof; a 
livisiori of a party state,, or officer or employee th<jrec: . \. U M ; .i party 
:e; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity 
zh sends, bri ngs, or causes to be sent or brouaht- ^nv ^H-'IH -^ another na^ty 
:e, 
1
 (c) 'Receiving state' means the state tr wlnrh -i • ; : 1 i a s s<--nr broughr , 
Copr 1 l i> 
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r Kan. Op. Atty. Gen. 63 
te as: 1988 WL 429838, *1 (Kan.A.G,)) 
sed to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or 
icies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for 
:ement with private agencies or persons. 
1(d) 'Placement1 means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family 
> or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not 
.ude any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or 
.eptic or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital 
>ther medical facility. 
•ARTICLE VIII. Limitations. 
'This compact shall not apply to: (a) The sending or bringing of a child 
» a receiving state by his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or 
er, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such 
tive or nonagency guardian in the receiving state. 
'ARTICLE III. Conditions for Placement. 
1(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought 
any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a 
iminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with 
and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws 
he receiving state governing the placement of children therein. . . .f 
tiasis added) . 
Thus, Kansas has attempted to insure that children brought into Kansas are 
rded some protection. See K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278 (c); K.S.A. 65- 509; 
* ex rel. v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244 (1980); Matter of Adoption 
Dbson, 8 Kan. App. 2d 772 (1983). See also fThe Interstate Placement of 
3ren: A Preliminary Report1, Council of State Governments (1978); J. Hall, 
Out-of-State Placement of Children: A National Survey 21 (Major Issues in 
lile Justice Information and Training, 1982). Clearly, if a governmental 
:y places the child in an out-of-state institution, the procedures contained 
le interstate compact on placement of children become applicable. See 
>gar v. Parry, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (1980), app. dism., 431 N.Y.S. 2d 813, 
:ied on other grounds, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 438. 
> situation presented concerns what is essentially a private adoption 
.ving a pregnant nonresident mother. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b mandates the 
.cability of the interstate compact to adoption proceedings. The required 
jdures are set forth at K.S.A. 38-1202. Independent adoptions in Kansas 
>rically have occurred without the assistance of a licensed agency. L. 
I, 'The Kansas Family Law Handbook,' 6-3, 6-4 (1983). Nationwide estimates 
that independent placements exceed agency placements two-to-one. Evans, 
ipendent Adoptions: In Whose Best Interests?1, 53 OK. B.J. 1805 (1982). 
Ler states' courts involved with adoptions and enforcing procedural 
rements contained in the interstate compact focus on the activities of 
>ns other than the natural parents of a child. Those courts have indicated 
failure to comply with the procedures of the interstate compact on placement 
ildren may jeopardize independent adoptions. The Montana supreme court 
Copr. @ West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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oved a child from the prospective adoptive parents1 care and placed the child 
foster care because the compact procedures were not followed. The Adoption of 
.M., 608 P. 2d 130 (1980). In T.M.M. the prospective adoptive couple went to 
ther state and picked up the child. The court recognized that the compact did 
apply to 'the sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his 
ent . . . and leaving the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian 
the receiving state.f However, the court stated that because the prospective 
ptive parents are not relatives of the natural mother, or nonagency guardians, 
y were required to comply with the requirements of the compact. Id. at 133. 
Arizona supreme court found that a juvenile court was without authority to 
ow foster parents to take a minor out of the state for placement unless the 
ms of the compact were complied with. Pima v. Fisher, 610 P.2d 64 (Az. 1980). 
ssuming, arguendo, that limitations contained in Article VIII(a) of K.S.A. 
1202 do not apply to parents and that K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b therefore 
eludes a mother who does not comply with the compact from bringing her child 
o Kansas for the purpose of independently placing that child for adoption, if 
child is as yet unborn at the time the mother enters the state the 
licability of the compact is limited. Under K.S.A. 38-1202, Article 11(a), 
Id means 'a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, 
rdianship or similar control.1 While an unborn child is subject to a certain 
ree of parental control, the term 'child1 within the adoption statutes means a 
ing child who can receive attention. In re Adoption of Nelson, 2 02 Kan. 663 
69). 'We do not ordinarily use the term child to mean an unborn child.' Id. at 
See also Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F. 2d 750 (Conn. 1974); Poole v. Endsley, 
F. Supp. 1370 (5th Circ. 1974). Transporting expectant mothers to another 
isdiction until the baby is born appears to represent a creative circumvention 
the terms of the compact. Note, independent Adoption: 
3 Regulating the Middleman,• 24 W.L.J. 327, 334 at note 64 (1985). Such 
cumvention is properly addressed by the legislative body possessing the 
hority to regulate such matters. 
n summary, K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b mandates the applicability of procedures 
tained in the interstate compact on placement of children to adoption 
ceedings. These required procedures are set forth at K.S.A. 38- 12 02. 
icle VIII(a) expressly limits the applicability of the compact to certain 
sons and situations. There is some question whether these limitations operate 
allow a parent to bring his or her child into the state for private adoption 
poses. Nevertheless, if a woman is pregnant at the time she enters Kansas she 
not, for purposes of the compact, brought a fchild1 into the state. It is 
refore our opinion that the procedures contained in the interstate compact on 
cement of children and K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278(b) do not apply to a pregnant 
an who enters Kansas and then gives birth. 
y truly yours, 
ert T. Stephan 
orney General of Kansas 
Copr. ® West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ALSO PRESENT: Barry Adams 
Sandi Burningfiam 
Emily Kohlhase 
P A G E 4 



















P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Joel Ferre and Emily Kohlhase were absent at the 
beginning of the following proceedings.) 
THE REPORTER: It is 1:30 p.m. on April 1, 2002. 
My name is Amy Shemon with CitiCourt, 50 South Main Street, 
Suite 920, Salt Lake City, Utah. He are here to take the 
deposition of Michael Chapman in the case of Alternative 
Options and Services for Children, et al. versus Michael 
Chapman, et al. 
Present are Larry Jenkins for the Plaintiffs and 
Craig Barlow for the Defendants. Also present are Barry 
Adams and Sandi Burningham. 
MICHAEL RONALD CHAPMAN, 
having been first duly sworn by the Reporter, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JENKINS: 
Q Would you please state your full name? 
A Michael Ronald Chapman. 
Q Mr. Chapman, have you ever had your deposition 
taken before? 
A Yep. 
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1 a little bit, and you understand that the court reporter is 
2 going to be taking down everything I say and everything you 
3 say and anything that anybody else says. So it's important 
4 that both of us speak clearly and we respond audibly, talk 
5 audibly so that she can take down the things that we say. 
6 You understand that you are under oath. 
7 Would you briefly give le your educational background 
8 after high school? 
9 A I have a bachelors of arts in social science and I 
110 have attended several different courses working on my masters 
111 program and other courses of that nature. 
12 Q So you have a bachelors and you don't have a 
13 masters yet. Is that what you are saying? 
14 A les. 
15 Q Now, you say you have taken other courses towards 
16 your masters. About ho^ w far along do you think you are in 
17 the masters process? 
18 A I probably have another year. 
19 Q When did you get your bachelors? 
20 A March 1971. 
21 Q Where did you get that from? 
22 A Portland State University. 
23 Q Do you hold any licenses or anything like that? 
24 A I as a certified social worker for the State of 
25 Arizona, and that's up every two years. 
5 
PAGE 6 
1 Q What does it mean to be a certified social worker 
2 in Arizona? I think I know what it means here, but what does 
3 it mean down there? 
4 A Well, I can — If you work for the State of 
5 Arizona, you don't need to be licensed to have a 
6 certification. But if you work for a private agency, then 
7 you need to have some type of certification. 
8 Q Are there like educational requirements to be a 
9 certified social worker, or do you just have to take a test? 
10 A Well, different levels depending on which ! 
11 classification you have. So if you had a bachelors it's one 
12 level, and a oasters is another level. 
13 Q So with your bachelors that gives you a specified 
14 level of a certified social worker? 
15 A Right. 
16 Q So how many different distinctions are there in the 
17 certified social workers? 
18 A I think there's three. 
19 Q Where does the bachelors fit on the scale of 
20 things? 
21 A Well, I could — I mean, that's the first level. 
22 Q To go to a different level would you have to have 
23 another degree or what would you have to have? 
24 A You have to have a masters degree. 
25 Q Do you have any license in Utah? 
6| 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Could you briefly give me your work experience 
3 after college? 
4 A I worked for the State of Arizona for 25 years as a 
5 supervisor. I started off as a supervisor in the Cottage for 
6 Handicapped Children for six months and then went to be a 
7 social service worker — social worker during different 
8 years, and then I was a supervisor for three years. And then 
9 I — in February of 1987 I came to the Arizona Interstate 
10 Compact and worked there 10 years. 
11 I retired, took off nine months, and then I came to Utah 
12 as the compact administrator on August 3rd, 1998 and have 
13 been there ever since. 
14 Q Let me ask you. Is your title compact 
15 administrator or is it something different in Utah? 
16 A Oh, in Utah deputy compact administrator. 
17 Q Is there a compact administrator that supervises 
18 you? 
19 A Yeah, Patti Van Wagoner is my supervisor. 
20 Q Is her title compact administrator? 
21 A Um-hua. 
22 Q Now, it sounds like ~ So you graduated in '71 and 
23 went to work in Arizona for the State. The biggest chunk of 
24 time it looks like, until about 1987, you were a social. 
25 worker. Here you assigned to any specific kinds of cases or 
7 
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1 divisions or anything during that chunk of time? 
2 A The first 10 years I worked for the Division of 
3 Disabilities as a social worker, and I had different jobs 
4 during that time. The first job was I was in an institution. 
5 And I had a case load of about 300 children and adults, and I 
6 was moving them from the institution into — back near their 
7 homes either in — How do you say it — well-cared homes to 
8 more independent homes. So I had a variety of children there 
9 with a variety of handicaps. I did that for 10 years. 
10 And then I went into child protective services, did that 
11 as a worker for two years. And then in that particular job 
12 my supervisor was like 90 miles away and I was in a small 
13 comounity. Pay son, Arizona, which is kind of like up in the 
14 woods. My job was doing adoptions, foster care, foster care 
15 training, child care, child care training, child protective 
16 services. So I did all those, had all the resources for two 
17 years. 
18 And then I went to Bullhead City as a supervisor. I had 
19 six workers. Then when I completed — Before I went to 
20 Phoenix in the Interstate, I had about 12 workers doing 
21 different kinds of jobs; child care, adoptions, child care 
22 training, and foster care training. Then I had C.P.S. 
23 workers go out in the field. So those are kind of the jobs 
24 that I had to give you some — 
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1 employment either with Arizona or Utah your entire career. 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q Let me ask you a few questions about your current 
4 job. How does the office work? If Patti Van Wagoner is the 
5 compact administrator, can you tell me what she does and then 
6 tell me what you do? 
7 (Mr. Ferre entered.) 
8 A Well, I am not certain. She was just hired a 
9 couple months ago, so I don't really know all her job duties. 
0 She's the deputy director of children's services. One of her 
1 jobs is to supervise my office. I guess if there's any 
2 issues I have, I take that to her for some kind of solution. 
3 Basically, my job that I've been doing is that I sake 
4 approvals on all private adoptions, state adoptions, private 
5 residential treatment center placements either in the state 
6 or going out, foster care placements, parent/relative 
7 placements coming in and out of the state. And so I sake 
3 sure that all the paperwork for the different compacts is in 
5 order. 
) Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Is there anyone else in the 
I office besides you and then, this Patti that's your 
! supervisor? 
! A I just hired Brooklyn Gray, who right now is 




Q That's the only ones that work in the office? 
! A Right. Well, with Interstate. There's other 
i people in the central office, — 
Q Sure. 
A — but that's all the people that work — 
Q Is your position full time? 
A Yes. 
Q Who was Patti Van Wagoner?s supervisor? 
A Richard Anderson. Be is the director of the 
division. 
Q When you worked in Arizona, it sounded like part of 
the time you dealt with adoption down there. What kind of 
things did you do with adoption when you were in Arizona? 
A As a social worker? 
Q Correct. 
A I would go out and do hone studies for step-parent 
adoptions, and I would go to court to finalize those 
adoptions. And then as a supervisor, I had one worker that 
did that when I was in Bullhead and then I supervised that. 
Q Before you went into the Arizona I.C.P.C, office, 
what experience did you have with interstate compact before 
that? 
A Well, as a worker and supervisor I had cases coming 
in and going out, state cases for placement in other states 
or placement — other states wanting to make it into my 
10 J 
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1 area. 
2 So as a courtesy among the other states we would do the 
3 home studies as well as the other states would do home 
4 studies for us to make the approvals given for foster care. 
5 They would have to get a license for adoptions or 
! 6 parent/relative/kinship placement. 
!
 7 Q Did you also do post-placement visits? 
8 A les. 
9 Q When you did a home study in Arizona, did it have 
10 to be signed off by somebody that had a masters degree or 
11 anything like that? 
12 A No. 
13 Q About your job here in Utah as compact 
14 administrator, what do you see your role as as the deputy 
15 compact administrator? 
16 A Pardon me? Again? 
17 Q What do you see your role as as the deputy compact 
18 administrator? 
19 A Well, I think number one is to review all the cases 
20 that come in. And if they are adoptions, if they meet all 
21 the criteria I approve those right away. If the case is 
22 going out, I make sure all the information is there that 
23 meets Utah or other criteria, send those out. And then the 
24 state cases, I review those to make sure that the cases that 
25 we send out have all the information for the other state to 
11 
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1 make a reasonable judgment with the home study they do. 
2 Q Do you kind of view yourself as, I guess — for 
3 lack of a better word, kind of the I.C.P.C, cop, or how do 
4 you — 
5 A I don't think so. I don't see myself as being 
6 that. I see myself as more following state law and just 
7 making sure that in the safety of children that — you know, 
8 that for adoptions that if a child is coming in it meets all 
9 those requirements. In case something happens later, then 
10 nothing will happen to that adoption. 
11 Q Let me ask you what is it that needs to be included 
12 in an I.C.P.C. packet. 
13 A For which type? 
14 Q For a private agency. 
15 A For adoption? 
16 Q For adoption, urn-hum. 
17 A I have a list here that actually was used before I 
18 came. Basically, we want the I.C.P.C. 100A, non-identifying 
19 background information on the mother and the father, medical 
20 release statements from the hospital, relinquishments from 
21 the mother and father 24 hours after the birth. The 
22 father — If the father doesn't have a relinquishment, then 
23 we ask for a statement of risk from the adoptive parents. 
24 And then a home study, which would — adoptive study which 
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1 So those are the items that we require to Bake approval. 
2 MR. JENKINS: Okay. I think I probably have the 
3 same thing here you are looking at. Why don't we lark it as 
4 an exhibit and we will see. 
5 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
6 identification by the Court Reporter.) 
7 A Okay. This is not the one I use for private 
8 agencies. 
| 9 Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Let me tell you this was produced 
10 to me by your lawyers so — 
11 A This is the one I use for the state cases. 
12 Q What's different on here than what you use in a 
13 private one? 
14 A In the private adoptions I don't ask whether the 
15 child is Native American or not, and I don't ask for 
16 financial medical plans or subsidy plans unless it's a state 
17 child. Then I ask for that because we have had so many 
18 difficulties with other states and their subsidy plans and 
19 how it all works. And I usually don't ask for the birth 
20 certificate or social security card. 
21 Q Why are those differences made — distinctions made 
22 between private adoptions and state adoptions? 
23 A Generally, I find that the private agencies 
24 licensed by the State on those items — that they should 
25 handle those items, except for the Native American, which for 
13 
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1 a long time there was a controversy of whether we should 
2 notify the tribe if a birth mother Native American wants to 
3 give up her child. And the Attorney General's office has 
4 said that that's not an issue for us, so I took that off. 
5 These other items here generally, say the financial 
6 medical plan or adoption subsidy plan, private agencies all 
7 handle that. Most of the times there is no subsidy. And 
8 then the birth certificate and social security card, that's 
9 up to the agencies. 
10 Now, for the state cases, the Native American issue, the 
11 State needs to follow on that because it's a different role 
12 than a private birth mother. Financial medical plans, I 
13 always ask for that and the subsidy just because I have such 
14 an issue with the other states. And the social security 
15 card, birth certificates, they are generally part of the 
16 record, 
17 Q When you say with the financial medical and 
18 adoption subsidy you have an issue with that with other 
19 states, what kinds of things are you talking about? Just if 
20 they bring the child in that it's going to cause some 
21 financial problems for Utah or what? 
22 A Right. There's been some changes last year in 
23 January. 
24 MR. BARLOW: Go off the record. 
25 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 was remarked for 
14 J 
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1 identification by the Court Reporter.) 
2 Q (By Mr. Jenkins) We were going to talk about ~ 
3 Maybe you finished it. Tell me if you did - about why you 
4 have an issue with the financial medical and the adoption 
5 subsidies with the other states. 
l b A We have had a lot of problems with adopting parents 
7 thinking they were going to get sane kind of subsidy from the 
8 state that sent the child. And with this new rule a year 
9 ago, new federal rule, it really breaks it down to — This is 
10 just from my memory, but if a child is S.S.I, eligible and 
11 not in state custody, they can apply with Adoptive Parents 
12 Act for the subsidy. If the child is a ward of the state in 
13 another state, a sending state, then they have to apply 
14 there. 
15 So when the state sends the child, I always want to know 
16 what the subsidy plan is. If the adoption agency is working 
17 with the placement, I figure since they are a licensed 
18 agency, if they have a subsidy, that they should be able to 
19 work that out. Generally, it would come out of the State of 
20 Utah. We just had so many problems with that with other 
21 states. I don't know what it is. 
22 Q Let me ask you on this checklist, this Exhibit 1, 
23 then is that for kids coming into Dtah or is this for kids 




1 Q Children, you know, being placed in Utah from 
2 another state or kids going from Utah to another state? 
3 A I use the same format, the same — This is the same 
4 format everybody has been using before me. 
5 Q And the purpose of this information is to, what, 
6 make sure that the placement is in the child's best 
7 interests? 
8 A For the safety of the child. 
9 Q Maybe this is a philosophical question, but if you 
10 have an adoption agency that I suppose is charged to protect 
11 the best interests of the child, why do we need this other 
12 layer if it's an agency adoption? 
13 A It's the state law they need to have the approval 
14 from the compact office, which is my office, coming into the 
15 state. And then other states have the same law, so we need 
16 to get the approval from the other state. So they send it 
17 through me, I sign off on it, send it to the other state to 
18 get approval. 
19 Q That's primarily the reason, because the law says 
20 you have to do it? 
21 A The safety of the child, to make sure everything 
22 is -
23 Q I am saying, again, if the agency is charged to 
24 protect the interests of the child, why from your standpoint 
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1 A I just think it's a good safety check for the child 
2 to sake sure the agency - You know, I get a lot of cases 
3 that I have to ask for additional information that the 
4 agencies are not getting. 
5 Q I am just wondering - Let's say you have a Otah 
6 birth mother and a Utah adoptive family. You don't have to 
7 provide that; do you, if it's a private agency, Utah birth 
8 mother, Utah adoptive family? 
9 A It doesn't go through me. 
10 Q Who makes sure the agency does what they are 
;1 supposed to do there? 
.2 A I guess it would be 19 to the judge, and I guess it 
3 would be up to the licensing person in Utah because they 
4 review the records. 
5 Q But wouldn't those same kind of backstops be there 
.6 for a placement that goes across state lines, the judge and a 
7 licensing person? 
8 A I don't understand. 
9 Q I guess the question is, you know, why do we even 
0 need interstate compact for a private agency adoption if the 
1 agency is already charged with protecting the best interests 
2 of the child? 
3 A Well, like I said, some agencies don't provide the 
4 information that's required. If we haven't asked for that, 
5 they wouldn't give the information, There might be something 
17 
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1 that happens and the adoption would be finalized and then 
I maybe the birth father would have something to go back on and 
3 overturn the adoption. I m not saying all agencies do that, 
! but the reason I have some of the holdups in some of these 
) adoptions is because of what is lacking in the referral. 
3 Q flow many private agency I.C.P.C. clearances do you 
/ do in a year approximately? 
) A I don't b o w exactly. I have about 400 incoming 
) cases a year for all adoptions. 
) Q So that includes state adoptions? 
i A Hi? 
! Q That includes state adoptions? 
) A Yes. 
t Q About how many outgoing cases do you do a year? 
i A Oh, about 250, something like that, just an average , 
! estimated guess. 
Q What do you see your role, if any, being vis-a-vis 
: the Office of Licensing and the Department of Human 
1 Services? Do you see that you have any role with the Office 
1
 of Licensing? 
A Role how? I don't understand. 
Q Well, 1 understand with the Office of Licensing 
they are to make sure that the agencies are acting in 
compliance. At least that's what I understood Jan to say 
this morning. I just wonder. Do you see yourself as having 
18 
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1 any role in helping her do that? 
2 A Well, if I get a complaint, I forward that on to 
3 licensing from either a parent or from another state agency, 
4 but I don't have any other role than that. 
5 Q Do you ever give advice to Jan? 
6 A Advice how? 
7 Q Say on the applicability of the interstate compact 
8 in a certain situation. 
9 A How it works. I have talked to her about that. I 
10 have talked to the agencies in Utah and other states about 
111 how it works. 
112 Q I understand you have some role in some national 
13 organization now? Is that right? 
14 A I am the president of the Interstate Compact of 
15 Administrators. Last year in Chicago they voted me 
16 president, and then in '03 my term ends. This is the second 
17 time I've been president. I was the president of Arizona 
18 also. 
19 Q What is the title of that organization? What is it 
20 and what does it do? 
21 A Actually — How do I want to say? It has the 
22 interstate and it has directors, associations, and has 
23 just — I think there's about eight or twelve, I am not 
24 certain, agencies like interstate. What they do is they — 
25 the State pays them money every year and they — We have 
19 
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1 meetings once a year, and we try to resolve problems and 
2 things like that. And it helps us do that. And they are the 
3 ones that made up the compact. 
4 Q As president of that organization, what do you do? 
5 Is there something — some responsibility that you have? 
6 A Well, it's a volunteer position, number one. 
7 Number two, if there's any issues, we have a board also. We 
8 have a president, vice president, treasurer, and then we have 
9 five board members. And then we try to resolve those issues 
10 and then we put it up for a vote at the annual meeting that 
11 we have. 
12 For example, the annual meeting is this April 28th or 
13 29th here in Salt Lake. And we have an agenda, sort of 
14 things that we try to go through. We also have training 
15 classes like on ICWA and other issues like that, and then we 
16 invite private agencies and other people that are interested, 
17 social workers and that kind of thing. So basically those 
18 are the job tasks. 
19 Q How many people typically come to these national 
20 meetings to vote? 
21 A It really depends. This year there's a lot of 
22 budget cutting in the states. I don't know how many will 
23 attend this year. Generally, we have anywhere from say 35 to 
24 45 states attend. 
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1 person or — 
2 A Well, several states nay send — Like Georgia has 
3 been sending three people, but they only get one vote. 
4 California, who is a massive organization — state and has 
5 interstate broken down into these different ways, they may 
6 send six or seven people. But they only get one vote. 
7 Q Do you find in dealing with all the other states 
8 that all the state compact administrators see things the same 
9 way you do? 
110 A No. 
11 Q How much flexibility do you see is in the compact 
12 itself for doing things differently? You told me how you do 
13 it as far as bringing in information and disseminating 
14 information. What kind of flexibility does a state compact 
15 administrator have? 
16 A I think it's based upon their state laws. 
17 Q Hell, assuming - I guess that the compact is the 
18 same in every state; isn't it? 
19 A Teah, everybody has the same compact law. 
20 Q So if everybody has the same compact law, wouldn't 
21 you hope that the interpretations would be fairly similar? 
22 A Well, I think when you look at adoption — For 
123 example, North Carolina is a good example. Ihey follow their 
24 adoption laws like we follow our adoption laws, and so they 
125 require that these things be set up before they give 
21 
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1 approval. So there's a little difference. 
2 And see — I will give you an example of Nevada. They 
3 require, for example, a state social worker go out and visit 
4 and sign off where we don't require that. We have a licensed 
5 agency and, you know, that's good enough for us because they 
6 are licensed by the State of Utah. So there's little 
7 differences. Some require birth mothers to give summaries, 
8 what they did, that kind of thing. 
9 Q Are there some that actually preclude a birth 
10 mother from going to another state with the child? 
11 A Pardon me? 
12 Q Are there some that actually may keep a birth 
13 mother from traveling to another state? 
14 A I don't know how they could do that. 
15 Q Sell, by not giving approval. 
16 A I don't understand. 
17 Q Maybe we can get into it later as we work through 
18 things. 
19 Tell me how — You walked through and told me the kinds 
20 of things that you typically get. 
21 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 was marked for 
22 identification by the Court Reporter.) 
23 Q (By Mr. Jenkins) I have handed you Exhibit 2 to 
24 your deposition. Maybe this will make the package a little 
25 more complete. Can you tell me what this is? 
221 
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1 A This is the I.C.P.C. 100A form, State of Utah. 
2 Q Tell me what the purpose of this form is. 
3 A This form we use for actually sending cases out. 1 
4 It could be used for private adoptions or state workers use 
5 the same form or residential treatment centers, and sometimes 
6 I get the same form coming in because some of the agencies 
7 send it out to other states where they accept this — they 
8 can use this form or their own form, which is pretty much the 
9 same. 
10 So we use this to get information, and at the bottom we 
11 have where the sending agency signs off the compact, state 
12 signs off, and then the approval at the bottom. 
13 Q Now, does this go with all of the other information 
14 we talked about before? 
15 A Yes. At the front it says Form 100A completed, 
16 signed by the birth parents, guardian, worker. 
17 Q So all this goes together and that comprises an 
18 interstate compact package? 
19 A Right. 
20 Q Have you ever seen a situation where the -- where a 
21 birth mother or birth father signs as the sending agency? 
22 A Sure, that -
23 Q That happens? 
24 A Sure. 
25 Q Does it happen a lot? 
23 
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1 A Yeah. 
2 Q Have you had any particular concerns about that at 
3 all in your experience with interstate compact? 
4 A No. 
5 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3 was marked for 
6 identification by the Court Reporter.) 
7 Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Let me represent to you what this 
8 is. I pulled this off the Department of Human Services' Web 
9 page, I believe, either that or else off the State of Utah's 
10 Web page. It's just the interstate compact, an easy-to-read 
11 version. It was either that or copy it out of my itty-bitty 
12 statutes. 
13 Let me ask you a few questions about the compact itself 
14 and your understanding. Is it your understanding that the 
15 sending state also has to give approval for an interstate 
16 placement or just the receiving state? 
17 A Well, I don't know about approval. They have to 
18 sign off on it as the sending state. 
19 Q So if the sending state doesn't sign on the form, 
20 then as the receiving state you won't take it? 
21 A Not if it's not a compact, right. Say it again. 
22 Q If you get - Say you get a 100A with all the stuff 
23 but there's no signature on the sending state line. Would 
24 you take it? What do you call that when the sending state 
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MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et. al. 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 020905025 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
COUNT 
Clen 
The Court has before it requests for decision in connection 
with the following motions: (1) Defendants' Michael Chapman, Robin 
Arnold Williams, Janice P. Knaphus and the Utah Department of Human 
Services ( "Defendants A") Motion To Dismiss; (2) Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment; and (3) Defendants' Michael 
Chapman, Dennis Eshman, Association Of Administrators Of The 
Interstate Compact on the Placement Of Children and The American 
Public Human Services Association ("Defendants B") Motion To 
Dismiss. Oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2003 after which 
the Court took the matter under advisement. 
Defendants A contend that plaintiff's complaint against them 
should be dismissed because: 1) plaintiffs lack standing; and 2) 
the Court lacks jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue 
that they do have standing as advocates for expectant mothers and 
that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the controversy under 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act1. 
Plaintiffs request that the Court-Convert^ ^ defendants • 
Motion To Dismiss into a Motion For Summ^iy^iSr&dgment based upon 
^^rq 
ALTERNATE OPTIONS & PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN 
ET. AL. V. CHAPMAN ET. 
AL. 
In order to have standing a party must assert its own legal 
rights and interests and may not attempt to claim the legal rights 
and interest of third parties. Shelledy v Lore 836 P.2d 786, 789 
(Utah 1992) (citing, Warth v Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
(1975)(citations omitted). In this case, plaintiffs lack standing 
because they fail to request relief for an alleged violation of 
their own constitutional rights. Instead, plaintiffs predicate 
their entire allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of 
non-party expectant mothers. 
Parties such as plaintiff may, under certain circumstances, 
have standing to assert the rights of a third party. In order to 
do so the claimant party must show: "first, the presence of some 
substantial relationship between the claimant and the third 
parties; second the impossibility of the right holders asserting 
their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a 
dilution of third parties1 constitutional rights" Shelledy at 789 
(citing, Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1975)). 
After applying the third party standing factors to the parties 
in this case, the Court concludes that plaintiffs lack the ability 
the submission of exhibits outside the context of the pleading. 
Upon consideration, the Court concludes that the attached matters 
are relied upon in the pleadings and accordingly the motion shall 
remain a Motion To Dismiss. URCP 12(b). 
ALTERNATE OPTIONS & PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN 
ET. AL. V. CHAPMAN ET. 
AL. 
to assert the third party rights of expectant mothers. The Court 
finds that plaintiffs relationship with the third party expectant 
mothers is not "substantial", the third party mothers are capable 
of asserting their own constitutional rights, and there is no 
evidence that failure to permit third party standing will somehow 
dilute the expectant mothers' constitutional rights. 
For these reasons the Court concludes that plaintiffs lack 
standing to bring claims on behalf of non-party expectant mothers. 
This conclusion is inextricably linked with defendants' arguments 
on declaratory action and therefore obviates the need to address 
those issues further. By granting defendants A's Motion To Dismiss 
I implicitly deny plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and grant Defendants B's Motion To Dismiss. 
Defendants A's counsel to prepare and Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry and submit it to the Court for final review and 
signature. 
Dated this day of January, 2 002. 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020905025 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
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Paqe 1 (last) z& 
CRAIG L. BARLOW (#0213) 
JOELA.FERRE(#7517) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, et at, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 020905025 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Court has before it Defendants' Michael Chapman, Robin Arnold-Williams, Janice 
P. Knaphus and the Utah Department of Human Services (the "State defendants") Motion to 
Dismiss; Defendants' Michael Chapman, Dennis Eschman, Association of Administrators of the 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children and the American Public Human Services 
Association (the "Association defendants") Motion to Dismiss; and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2003. 
FltED Br?SiGT COURT 




1. The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (the "ICPC") is a uniform 
law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the United States Virgin 
Islands. 
2. Utah has adopted the ICPC, which is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 et 
seq. 
3. Article VII of the ICPC requires each state which is a party to the ICPC to appoint 
an officer "who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in his jurisdiction . . 
.." Defendant Michael Chapman is the Deputy Compact Administrator for the State of Utah. 
4. In Utah, the Compact Administrator's office is located within the Division of 
Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), which is a division of defendant Department of Human 
Services (the "Department"). The Department, through the DCFS, is responsible for accepting 
and reviewing information submitted in connection with adoptive placements subject to the 
ICPC. 
5. Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams is the Executive Director of the Department. 
6. Defendant Janice P. Knaphus is a licensing specialist in the Office of Licensing of 
the Department with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies. 
7. Defendant Association of Administrators of the ICPC ("AAICPC") is a private 
organization based in Washington D.C. Its members consist of the Compact Administrators (or 
2 
other in this position with different titles) for each state. Defendant Chapman is the president of 
the AAICPC for the term 2001 through 2003. 
8. Defendant American Public Human Services Association (the "APHSA") is a 
nonprofit corporation based in Washington D.C. The APHSA provides secretarial 
(administrative) services to the AAICPC and also provides similar services to other related 
organizations. 
9. Defendant Dennis Eshman is an employee of the APHSA and provides secretariat 
services for the AAICPC. 
10. Plaintiffs are child-placing agencies licensed by the State of Utah. 
11. On December 3, 2002, the State defendants notified each of the plaintiffs that it 
would utilize AAICPC Opinion #49 as guidance on regulatory and licensing actions concerning 
child placing agencies. 
12. Opinion #49, issued by the AAICPC on June 30, 1986, expresses the AAICPC's 
opinion regarding the application of the ICPC to a situation where a mother crosses state lines to 
deliver a child and place it for adoption in that state. 
13. The State defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on July 1, 2002. The 
State defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' claims. 
3 
14. The Association defendants moved to join the State defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and separately moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on October 17,2002. The 
Association defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Association 
defendants. 
15. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on October 16, 2002. Plaintiffs 
argued that the Opinion #49 is an incorrect interpretation of the ICPC. In response to defendants' 
motions, plaintiffs contend that they do have standing as advocates for expectant mothers and 
that the Court has jurisdiction to settle the controversy under Utah Declaratory Judgment Act. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs request that the Court convert the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
into a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the submission of exhibits outside the context 
of the pleading. Upon consideration, the Court concludes that the attached matters are relied 
upon in the pleadings and accordingly the motion remains a Motion to Dismiss. Utah R.Civ.P. 
12(b). 
2. In order to have standing a party must assert its own legal rights and interests and 
may not attempt to claim the legal rights and interests of third parties. Shelledv v. Lore. 836 P.2d 
786, 789 (Utah 1992) (citing Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 
4 
3. In this case, plaintiffs lack standing because they fail to request relief for an 
alleged violation of their own constitutional rights. Instead, plaintiffs predicate their entire 
allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of non-party expectant mothers. 
4. Plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, have standing to assert the rights of a 
third party. In order to do so, plaintiffs must show: "first, the presence of some substantial 
relationship between the claimant and the third parties; second the impossibility of the right 
holders asserting their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third 
parties' constitutional rights;' Shelledv. 836 P.2d at 789. 
5. Plaintiffs lack the ability to assert third party rights of expectant mothers because 
plaintiffs' relationship with third party expectant mothers is not "substantial," the third party 
mothers are capable of asserting their own constitutional rights, and there is nothing to indicate 
that failure to permit third party standing will somehow dilute the expectant mothers' 
constitutional rights. This conclusion is inextricably linked with defendants' arguments on 
declaratory judgment. 
Given the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; 
2. That the Association defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; 
5 
3ln 
3. That plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED; and 
4. That plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
DATED this % day of February, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved^ 4 ^ - ^ ^ . 
STEPHEN L. HENRHJH* f 
District Court Judge - " ' ^Wil 
Counsel for AssociatioirlJefl 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was served this 
c& day of February, 2003, on: 
Larry S. Jenkins 
G. Troy Parkinson 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael W. Homer 
Paul C. Farr 
Suitter Axland 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Secretary 
3fet 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins #4854 
Richard J. Armstrong #7461 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ay, 
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°eputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation, dba 
ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC 
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity as 
Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate 
Compact on Placement of Children and in his 
official capacity as President of the Association of 
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children; ROBIN ARNOLD-
WILLIAMS, in her official capacity as Executive 
Director of the Utah Department of Human 
Services; JANICE P. KNAPHUS, in her official 
capacity as Licensing Specialist in the Office of 
Licensing of the Utah Department of Human 
Services; the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, a governmental department of the 
State of Utah; DENNIS ESHMAN, in his official 
capacity as Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the 
Association of Administrators of the Interstate 
Compact on the Placement of Children, the 
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE 
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, and the 
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES 
ASSOCIATION, in its capacity as Secretariat of the 
Association of Administrators of the Interstate 
Compact on the Placement of Children, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 020905025 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, dba Act of Love, and Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., a Utah corporation, provide 
notice pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that they appeal the 
Order of this Count signed and entered on or about February 25, 2003, to the Utah Supreme 
Court. The February 25, 2003 Order granted defendants' motions to dismiss and also dismissed 
this action without prejudice. 
DATED this ^ £ day of February, 2003 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S.vjenki 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
v\\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h c ^ d a y of February, 2003, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Craig L. Barlow, Esq. 
Joel A. Ferre, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Attorneys for Utah Defendants 
Michael W. Homer 
Paul C. Farr 
Suitter Axland 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 45101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Association Defendants 
^pQfTK 
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